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Purpose of the Study
The objective of this Thesis is to examine the effect of investment advisor and stock characteristics 
on the advisors’ stock market return forecasts. An empirical study was carried out to find out which 
characteristics if any could explain one’s return expectations and perceived ability to forecast. In 
addition, an experiment, which examines whether framing manipulation affects ones’ views on the 
relations between firm characteristics and stock returns, was performed.
First, the effect of several advisor characteristics on expected returns is studied. Second, the 
existence of false-consensus effect in the return expectations is determined by comparing the real 
professional consensus and the perceived professional consensus on expected returns. Third, the 
effect of psychological manipulation on expected stock returns is tested in an experiment. The 
experiment on the relation between firm characteristics and stock return is carried out to study the 
effect of manipulation in the forecasts. Framing manipulation is used in order to test whether 
different framing of a question affects an advisor’s views on the relations of firm characteristics and 
stock returns. Respondents are divided into groups of which each respond to differently framed 
questions. Finally, regression analyses and statistical tests measure the significance of the results.
Data
The data in this study is obtained from a web-based survey, which was carried out in May 2006. 
The study covers Finnish investment advisors who have passed the FASD General Securities 
Examination. The empirical evidence is based on a large-sample survey with a total of 742 advisors 
participating in the survey.
Results
The main finding of this study is that investment advisors are affected by several factors when 
making return forecasts. I find that certain characteristics of an advisor explain one’s market return 
expectations statistically significantly. In particular, the gender of an advisor explains return 
expectations and the perceived ability to make return forecasts highly significantly. I also find that 
investment advisors on average perceive to be more optimistic on the future market returns than 
they really are. Moreover, framing manipulation has a significant effect on advisors’ views on the 
relations between firm characteristics and stock returns. Overall, the results suggest that a client 
asking for advice might get varying advice depending on how and to whom one poses the question.
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Agents in the financial markets have received increasing attention in the academic research, 
as during the past few years it has been acknowledged that agents are an important link 
between the market and the investors. The growing interest is no surprise given that investors 
need professional advice in order to construct a well-diversified and efficient portfolio in the 
financial markets, which offer ever-expanding and more complex investment opportunities. 
One important group of agents in the financial markets are the investment advisors whose role 
is to give recommendations on investment decisions for their clients. Hence, their expertise is 
a key to many investors’ success in asset management. Nevertheless, there is no idea on what 
kind of recommendations Finnish investment advisors give to their clients nor is there 
descriptive data on who the advisors are. In fact, whoever can give investment advice and 
charge from it in Finland as no licence or education is currently required by regulators1. This 
means that there are a wide variety of advisors out there of which most are without a doubt 
sincere professionals in their work. Yet, it is questionable whether all of them provide true 
expertise as some might foster overoptimistic expectations in their clients on investment 
advisors’ abilities to forecast the market movements. Based on a large body of evidence it is 
however highly unlikely that any investment advisor, investor, fund manager or analyst could 
continuously give recommendations on investment opportunities that would lead to 
outperforming the market. Though being important in investment decisions, having all the 
market information and using deliberate market timing in transactions do not guarantee better 
performance. One can only know ex post, which stocks would have been the ‘best-buys’ and 
what would have been the best market timing strategy. Therefore, all that an investment 
advisor can offer is expertise on the investment products and recommendations on investment 
strategy.
1.1. Motivation for the study
This study provides an overview on the recommendations the investment advisors give to 
their clients on expected equity returns. The investment advisors’ estimates on future 
expected market returns are inquired in both European markets and the emerging markets.
1 However, changes in the legislation will take place in 2007 and a licence will be required from all investment 
advisors in the European Union. For more details, see Appendix 1.
Stock return expectations of Finnish investment advisors: the effect of advisor and stock characteristics
Heidi Laukkanen, 2006
4
Also, this study examines the views of investment advisors on the relations between certain 
firm characteristics and expected stock return. The focus of the study is in recognising those 
advisor and firm characteristics that affect one’s return expectations. Given that the expected 
market return and the factors affecting the forecast are issues on which investment advisors 
give most of their recommendations on to clients, it is interesting to find out whether the 
views on future returns vary among the investment advisors. The study is carried out among 
investment advisors who can be classified as ‘professionals’ as all the participants have 
passed a General Securities Examination organised by the Finnish Association of Securities 
Dealers (FASD).
A large body of empirical evidence shows that subjects are affected by psychological biases 
in decision-making in several fields, including finance. In order to find out whether Finnish 
investment advisors’ advice is subject to some of the biases, the psychology behind the 
decision-making will be considered in this paper as well. The study on expected returns will 
be two-folds. First the respondents are asked to give their own estimate on the expected 
market returns for different time horizons. These estimates will form the professional 
consensus on the expected market return. After that, the investment advisors are asked to give 
their estimate on the professional consensus. That is, they are asked to forecast what the real 
professional consensus among Finnish investment advisors is. By comparing the two, the real 
professional consensus and the perceived professional consensus, it can be determined 
whether the professionals on average suffer from false-consensus effect and anchoring effect. 
Finally, the effect of advisor characteristics on the return expectations is analysed.
The relation between certain firm characteristics to realized stock returns (e.g. Banz, 1981, 
Fama and French, 1992) and to expected stock returns (e.g. Shefrin and Statman, 1995, Brav, 
Lehavy and Michaely, 2005) has been a popular subject of recent academic research. The 
findings have been somewhat consistent in that certain characteristics can be regarded as risk 
factors but some differences have been revealed as well. Opposing evidence has been found 
especially in studies on expected returns, as investors do not always seem to behave in 
accordance with the financial theory and empirical evidence on the risk-return relation. In this 
study the views of Finnish investment advisors on the relation between firm characteristics 
and expected return is examined by taking into account the behavioural aspects of decision­
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making. In a risk-return related experiment, this study uses psychological manipulation in 
order to reveal whether the investment advisors’ views are affected by the framing effect.
1.2. Research questions
The fact that there is no data on the investment advisors or on the recommendations they give 
raises several interesting questions with regards to the profession itself and the kind of advice 
the investment advisors give to their clients. Evidently return expectations and the 
recommendations on the optimal investment strategy are likely to vary among investment 
advisors. But to find out who gives the advice, to what extent the investment 
recommendations differ and why do they differ, a questionnaire on the preceding issues is 
sent to nearly 1500 investment advisors in Finland. The empirical study will answer the 
following research questions:
1. What estimates for the expected market return do investment advisors on average give 
to a client and what do they base their estimates on?
2. What is the perceived professional consensus on the expected market return among the 
advisors and does it differ from the real professional consensus? That is, do 
investment advisors on average know what their colleagues’ market return forecasts 
are or do the professionals collectively suffer from false-consensus effect?
3. Which firm characteristics if any affect investment advisors’ return expectations on an 
individual asset?
4. Do investment advisors see the firm characteristics and their effect on expected return 
in a different light when the questions are differently framed?
1.3. Structure of the paper
The study is structured in the following way. Chapter 2 presents the most relevant academic 
work on the equity premium. The chapter provides background information on how the equity 
premium is derived and used and how it relates to expected market returns. Chapter 3 
concentrates on presenting the firm characteristics that are found to correlate with equity 
returns. The empirical findings are presented on the viewpoint of both realized returns and 
expected returns. Chapter 4 introduces the psychological biases that affect decision-making 
and forecasting. The chapter concentrates on anchoring effect and framing effect but some
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other relevant biases are also presented briefly. The factors that are found to expose to the 
biases are examined as well. Chapter 5 first sets up the empirical research by describing the 
methodology, data and survey design used. After that, the results of the study are presented 
and analysed. Chapter 6 concludes the study and summarizes the results.
2. MARKET EQUITY PREMIUM
Equity premium - the excess return that the overall stock market provides over the risk-free 
rate - is considered to be the single most important determinant in investment decisions. The 
equity premium, by definition, drives future equity returns and is the key determinant in the 
cost of capital. It is an important determinant to companies in deciding whether or not to take 
a project as the financial evaluation of the project relies on the estimation of the equity 
premium. The equity premium also plays an important role in asset allocation decisions in 
determining the optimal fraction of the assets to be invested in equity and in bonds. (E.g. 
Mehra, 2003) Furthermore it is a significant component in the classic and widely used CAPM 
in that multiplying the premium with beta of an asset and simply adding the risk-free rate 
determines the expected return on an individual asset.
Since the equity premium has various important functions in financial decision-making, it is 
no surprise that along with studies on expected market return it has been a popular topic for 
academic research. Studies have mainly focused on finding the most proper method for 
computing the equity premium or finding a consensus premium to be used in market 
forecasts. Also, many studies have concentrated on finding a solution to the equity premium 
puzzle2 or on recognizing the variables that affect the market expectations. Even though most 
studies argue that long-term equity premium and average stock returns are somewhat 
predictable, there is no agreement on which method would generate the most reliable 
forecasts. Also, while some papers are continuously disputing on the prediction power of 
classic variables such as book-to-market, liquidity or market capitalization, others have 
provided empirical evidence on new predicting variables. A few papers even claim that no 
forecast method has real prediction ability. In fact, the lack of consensus on the ‘right’ method 
means that even if the views on the implied returns for both stock markets and bond markets
2 The equity premium puzzle is a term from Mehra’s academic work (2003, see also Mehra and Prescott, 1985), 
which denotes to the perception that the historical equity premium has been greater than can be rationalized.
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would be similar between subjects, the equity premium could differ significantly among 
investors.
The following subchapters will present previous research on the equity premium. The main 
focus is in presenting the different models used in forecasting the premium and factors that 
affect the estimates within these models. These are introduced fairly comprehensively as the 
variety of different methods and factors will help understanding why the estimates of the 
equity premium vary so significantly and what implications does the premium have to market 
return expectations. Finally, surveys on professional consensus on the equity premium will be 
introduced briefly in the last subchapter.
2.1. Some considerations on measuring the equity premium
The fact that arithmetic mean exceeds geometric mean whenever there is variability in annual 
excess returns means that the choice of the averaging method will have an effect in forecasts. 
When the variability of annual premium is high, the difference between the results from the 
two averaging methods can become significant and hence the implications on using one 
averaging method over the other can be of great consequence. Thus, the importance of the 
averaging method used in forecasting the premium is the greater the more volatile is the 
market or the asset in question. According to Welch (2000) the long-term historical arithmetic 
mean equity premium has exceeded the geometric mean premium by 2%. Dimson, March and 
Staunton (2003) examined the historical equity premium in 16 countries for the period of 
1900-2001 and found the choice of averaging method to be statistically significant. They find 
an annual difference of 2.1 percentage points (pps) in Sweden and as high as 5.4 pps in 
Germany in the realized equity risk premium depending on which averaging method was used 
in measuring the premium.
The equity premium is often given by long-term equity return less short-term bond return. 
The different investment horizon makes the equation unequal in that the equity premium will 
not only represent the risk premium but also the longer maturity of the equity investment. 
Abel (1999) decomposed the equity premium into two components: one representing the risk 
premium and the other representing the term premium. Able finds that the term premium 
accounts for 25% of the observed equity premium over the period of 1926-1993. This means 
that by using a short-term bond return instead of a long-term bond return in computing the
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equity premium, the premium is considerably higher. Although this will not affect inferences 
in comparing the use of different models (the variations in risk-free rate are only an additive 
constant), it is good to keep in mind that differences in equity premium estimates may partly 
result from using risk-free rates that differ in maturity. This suggests that when making 
studies on the equity premium expectations, the two components - expected market return 
and interest rate - have to be well defined in order to reduce the risk of misunderstandings.
2.2. Methods to forecast the equity premium
The most widely used method for computing the expected equity premium is to use the 
historically realized equity returns. However, the extrapolation of the historical data as a 
method of computing the estimates for future is debatable for several reasons. In addition to 
the more general problems facing the computing methods such as the choice of averaging 
method and the term premium discussed above, the historical method confronts some other 
severe setbacks. First, enhancements in corporate governance, unprecented growth in 
productivity and efficiency, improved possibilities to diversify portfolios both domestically 
and internationally and reduced transaction costs have all contributed to upward stock prices 
during the past few decades (Dimson et al, 2003). This creates a nonstationarity problem in 
using realized return data for estimating future returns and equity premium. That is, the world 
today is not the same as 20 years ago let alone a century ago and hence using a historical 
return as a base for future expectations might not provide the best forecasts. Second, the 
forecast depends on the time period observed. Although the nonstationarity problem decreases 
with more recent (and hence shorter) time series, new problems will arise when shorter time 
periods are used for forecasting. Short time series of stock returns tend to be more volatile and 
thus the estimates of equity premium derived from the historical data are likely to vary too 
much to be of practical use (Goyal and Welch, 2006). For example, Dimson et al find that if 
the expected equity premium for 2002 were estimated by using the realized premia of the two 
preceding years, the forecast for the premium in most countries would have been highly 
negative and hence meaningless. During the technology bubble of 2000-2001, several equity 
markets had a large negative return and underperformed bond markets heavily. Consequently, 
it would have been absurd to base the estimates for the future on these two exceptional years 
as it is generally expected that average stock returns are positive and exceed the return on 
bonds in the long-term.
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Another widely used method for predicting equity premium is the analysis of regressions 
between historical equity returns and certain company ratios or variables such as dividend 
growth rate, eamings-price ratio or even patterns in corporate finance. While some academics 
recommend smart investors to make their portfolio allocation and market-timing decisions 
based on certain state variables, which would predict the equity premium, other studies find 
contradicting results. Fama and French (2002) estimated the equity premium by using 
dividend and earnings growth rates to measure the expected returns. They suggest that the 
equity premium puzzle is really a phenomenon of the past few decades when capital gains 
have been larger than expected. Fama and French argue that estimates from the fundamentals 
yet provide better true estimates for the equity premium than the average of realized returns 
although not without setbacks3. They acknowledge that the dividend growth model (DGM) is 
subject to problems posed by drift in dividend policy. For example if companies will 
increasingly shift from paying dividends to repurchasing stocks, the DGM is likely to 
underestimate the equity premium as a result of lower dividend-price ratio. As is a problem 
with using historical returns in forecasting the future equity premium, during some years the 
estimates derived from predictive regressions could predict negative premium. In practice, 
this would mean that the investors expect stock returns to be less than the return for short­
term bonds or that investors expect a negative return for bearing risk.
By posing restrictions on the return forecasts and the signs of regression coefficients 
Campbell and Thompson (2005) find small out-of-sample predictive power for several 
variables which beats the prediction based on historical average. First, they assume that there 
is a theoretically expected sign for each regression coefficient between a variable and the 
expected returns. Second, they expect that investors do not forecast returns by just using the 
linear regressions mechanically but that they first rule out the regression coefficients with a 
‘wrong sign’. The R2 statistics are small but yet economically meaningful in that they would 
benefit investors in a very long term. Nonetheless, the predictive power is not significant
3 Fama and French give a few reasons for this. First, other fundamentals seem to favour the dividend and 
earnings growth models. For example, over the period 1951-2000 average realized returns exceeded the IRR on 
corporate investments, which evidently shows that the realized returns were above the expected during the 
period. The opposite would only imply that firms were making negative NPV investments intentionally, which 
seems implausible. Second, the Sharpe ratio for the equity premium from the two models remains fairly constant 
throughout the 129-year period, which suggests a roughly similar risk aversion for both sub-periods. On the 
contrary, Sharpe ratio for the equity premium from average realized stock return is two times larger for the 
period 1951-2000 than for 1872-1950; such an increase in risk aversion does not seem plausible.
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when the time period is extended. Goyal and Welch (2006) contradict with the views of 
Campbell and Thompson. They claim that the use of different methods and time periods in 
different studies is the reason for opposing results. Any variable may indicate a high level of 
correlation with the expected equity premium when the time period observed includes an 
especially good time period in terms of its predicting power. For example, solely following 
the dividend/price -ratio would only have paid off well during the Oil Shock in 1973-1975, a 
period which explains most of the variable’s prediction power in the past. Same kind of an 
‘observation-period-dependent’ explanation can also be found in many other variables that 
have been shown in earlier studies to have prediction power. Each variable seems to have 
their seasons of pits and peaks in terms of predicting power. Hence, by choosing a particular 
observation period, a variable may look like a useful tool for predicting the equity premium. 
Goyal and Welch demonstrate how even the smallest variations in observation period choices 
can make the difference on the statistical significance of the result.
While there is no consensus on how market premium should be measured or which standard 
premium to be used, the implications on financial economics decisions persist to be 
fundamental. The decisions on CAPM budgeting, asset allocation and so on rely on the 
estimated equity premium and as different forecasting methods may compute varying 
estimates for the premium, the consequences of choosing one method over the other can be 
crucial. A company may end up undertaking or rejecting a project depending on the 
computing method used. Or an investment advisor may give recommendations on asset 
allocation that are significantly different to the recommendations of his colleagues.
2.3. Empirical findings
Welch (2000) discusses the range of equity premium estimates that are suggested in the 
literature and used in the decision-making. He finds that the range of premia suggested is 
considerable. While theoretical arguments have predicted a premium of only 1-3%, historical 
premium and investors’ estimates suggest substantially higher estimates. Over the period of 
1926-1998 the popular Ibbotson Associates return figure suggests a premium of 9.4% while 
Shiller finds the premium to be 8.0% over the same period. Individual investors’ premium 
estimates have even seen double-digit numbers during the bull markets (see Welch for all 
references on premium estimates). Welch also carried out a survey of his own on equity 
premium among financial economists to provide ‘a common practice estimate for the
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premium. The short-term premium forecasts were found to be lower and more volatile than 
long-term premium forecasts. 20% of the respondents offered a monotonically increasing 
expected premium term structure in horizon, 50% expected a decreasing term structure and 
30% were expecting the equity premium to stay flat for the next 30 years. The professional 
consensus for equity premium hovers around 7% both for short-term and long-term horizons, 
short-term premia being somewhat lower. Yet, the range of premium estimates is fairly wide 
when the pessimistic and optimistic averages are taken into account. Moreover, the results are 
affected by behavioural biases, which will be further examined in Chapter 4 in relation to 
Welch’s survey.
It is widely accepted that markets follow a random walk in the short-term and hence short­
term market movements should not affect the equity premium nor market return expectations. 
However, Welch (2000) finds that short-term market movements affect financial 
professionals’ expectations. The question on whether or not a one-day market movement 
affects one’s forecast on equity premium gives an idea on how the professionals react to 
market movements in practice. The average answer was -0.367 (in scale of-1 to 1, where 0 
means that market movement has no effect on the estimate), which suggests that bull market 
lowers the aggregate estimated equity premium. Yet, this negative feedback rule should only 
be seen in long time periods. Moreover, by comparing the results in Welch’s updates of the 
original study4 it can be observed that the respondents had lowered their estimates during the 
bear market. Although most of the respondents in 1998 had indicated to follow the negative 
feedback rule, they really ended up doing the opposite. The mean estimated equity premium 
was lower in 2001 than three years before even though the market had been going down 
during the three-year period. However, the changing consensus may also indicate other 
factors than positive feedback rule such as new approaches to estimating the expected 
premium (Dimson et al, 2003).
4 Welch I., 2000, Views of Financial Economists on the Equity Premium and Other Issues, Journal of Business, 
Vol. 73, p.501-537 and Welch I., 2001, The Equity Premium Consensus Forecast Revisited, Cowles Foundation 
Discussion Paper No. 1325.
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3. FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND THE EXPECTED RETURN
The CAPM5 describes the relationship between risk and expected return by using beta to 
denote the regression of a security’s return on the market return. The CAPM assumes that 
there is a positive linear relationship between an asset’s expected return and its market beta. 
That is, the higher the beta of an asset, the more it is expected to generate return. The model 
assumes markets to be efficient which means that, among other things, investors are rational 
and no mispricing of stocks can occur in the market. Thus, in efficient capital markets all firm 
characteristics that can forecast future returns would only reflect risk (Fama 1970). Yet in 
practice, mispricing might occur due to imperfections in capital markets.
Evidence regarding the positive relationship between beta and stock returns is somewhat 
mixed. Several studies show that the market beta works well in single-factor models but not in 
multi-factor models. In the early 1980s several studies found evidence that the single-factor 
CAPM is inadequate in explaining the expected stock returns. They found that many other 
variables such as debt/equity -ratio, eamings/price -ratio and market capitalization could all in 
part explain expected stock returns in addition to beta. Furthermore, they recognised some 
anomalies to exist; for example small firms were found to generate higher risk-adjusted 
returns than other firms (Banz, 1981). The evidence on investors’ return expectations is also 
mixed. Shefrin (2001) finds empirical evidence on investors’ return expectations that 
contradicts with the positive relation of risk and return - a cornerstone principle of financial 
theory. His study shows that even though financial professionals in principle may state that 
there is a positive relation between risk and return, in practice investors make judgements that 
indicate a negative relation between the two. Brav et al (2005) find support for the 
relationship between the beta and the expected returns, which is again consistent with the 
CAPM.
Despite the evidence on certain anomalies such as size premium, there is no theory on why 
these anomalies should prevail. Hence, it is possible that they will be arbitraged away over 
some time period or that the anomalies found a few decades ago have already disappeared. 
Also, the findings in multi-factor models vary depending on the time period, return intervals 
and the methodology used in the study. Although event studies produce useful information on
5 The capital asset pricing model of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965).
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the behaviour of stock prices, Fama (1998) finds that most anomalies that have been 
recognised are highly sensitive to the methodology used. Fama points out that there is roughly 
an even split between findings of overreaction and underreaction to market information which 
indicates that the expected abnormal return from these anomalies is zero. Consequently, Fama 
acknowledges that anomalies are simply chance results and, when all put together, are not 
against market efficiency either. In addition, the findings may be different as some studies use 
expected returns while others use realized returns as a proxy for return expectations. Schwert 
(2002) examined a wide range of earlier studies on different anomalies and found that the 
explanatory power of most of the variables in these studies had decreased in time or even 
reversed. One scenario is that when investors have recognized all of these variables and 
arbitraged the anomalies away, the CAPM would again become more accurate in predicting 
future returns. Another view is that when basing economic models on more realistic 
conceptions of investors and other agents in the market by incorporating the findings on 
human behaviour and decision-making into the models, the explanatory power of the asset 
pricing models will increase. Sheffin and Statman (1994) were the first to construct an asset­
pricing model (BAPM), a model, which takes into account behavioural factors and recognises 
both rational traders and those who make cognitive errors. However, employing BAPM 
instead of CAPM in practical use has not yet turned out to be a solution for making better 
return forecasts.
But which firm characteristics do influence equity returns? Moreover, are the correlations 
between returns and firm characteristics positive or negative and does the sign differ if 
expected returns are used instead of realized returns? Chapter 3.1 summarizes the highly cited 
studies that first found evidence on explanatory power in certain variables as well as some of 
the more recent studies. Although most of the characteristics are not independent of one 
another but instead rather dependent on each other they are now analysed separately and 
references are made between the characteristics. Chapter 3.2 concentrates on examining 
which firm characteristics affect the stock return expectations of investors.
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3.1. Empirical findings on returns
3.1.1. Liquidity
Empirical evidence shows that expected returns are an increasing function of illiquidity both 
across stocks and over time. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) used the bid-ask spread of a 
stock as a measure for illiquidity. They find asset returns to be an increasing and concave 
function of the spread but that the slope of the return-spread relation declines with larger 
spread. The return-spread relation holds even when firm size is added to the model as an 
explanatory variable. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1995) find empirical evidence supporting 
the illiquidity premium. They find that after adjusting for the risk, relatively illiquid stocks 
should have higher required returns than more liquid stocks, which is caused by information 
asymmetry in the market. Pastor and Stambaugh (2001) studied the effect of market-wide 
liquidity to stock returns. They find that those stocks that are highly sensitive to the 
fluctuations in the average market liquidity earn significantly higher returns than stocks with 
low sensitivity even when adjusted to several variables such as firm size and momentum 
factors. Yet, Pastor and Stambaugh as well as Amihud (2002) find the illiquidity effect to be 
stronger for low capitalization firms, which suggests that the illiquidity effect is also related to 
the size effect of stock returns. That is, stocks of small firms have higher expected returns 
than larger firms, which is due to both low market capitalization and the expected illiquidity. 
However, Amihud finds that the unexpected increase in the illiquidity of a stock has a 
negative effect on contemporaneous stock return, as the stock price will decline to make the 
expected return go up.
3.1.2. Firm size
Following the evidence on illiquidity and its relation to firm size, it can be acknowledged that 
a small firm tends to be riskier than larger firm and hence have higher return expectation. 
According to Banz (1981), ‘the size effect’ confirms that the CAPM is misspecified. Banz 
finds evidence that small stocks have had higher returns than larger firms and what is 
predicted by the CAPM even when adjusted for the risk. However, he finds no difference 
between the risk-adjusted returns of mid-cap firms and large firms. Banz also acknowledges 
that the size of a firm might just act as a proxy for another factor that correlates with the 
market value. One theory could be that the firm size is related to the amount of information 
generated. As a consequence, the lack of information on most small firms would reduce
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diversification and lead to higher returns for smaller firms. Fama (1998) however considers 
Banz’s finding of size premium purely as an anomaly, which has arisen as the event sample 
has been chosen and the returns being measured in a way that supports the outcome. By 
analysing a range of event studies such as the one of Banz, Fama concludes that while no 
model can accurately predict future returns, the anomalies such the size effect are not against 
market efficiency.
Chan and Chen (1991) propose that the earnings prospects of a firm are a factor that affects 
the riskiness of a stock investment and hence the expected stock returns. When the market 
anticipates a company to have poor future prospect the stock price will drop and hence the 
book-to-market ratio will go up. The cost of capital for firms with poor prospects will be 
higher than for firms with good prospects and therefore the expected return will also be 
higher. They find that small firms tend to be those that have not being doing well. That is, 
they have lost market value due to poor performance. This suggests that small firms have 
higher expected returns than larger firms. Yet, Chan and Chen emphasize that small size by 
itself does not necessarily imply higher risk but that these firms may well have other 
characteristics that make them riskier such as high leverage or inefficiency. In line with the 
findings of Chan and Chen, Fama and French (1992) find that realized stock returns are 
negatively related to size and positively related to book-to-market ratio. That is, in order to 
compensate for higher risk in low capitalization and high book-to-market stocks, the expected 
rate of return is higher than the expected market return. Book-to-market ratio is then acting as 
a proxy for firms’ financial distress risk that is not accounted in beta. Their finding is based 
on the rational valuation theory, which suggests that the two characteristics serve as indicators 
of risk through their relation with the economic prospects of a company.
3.1.3. Capital Structure
Bhandari (1988) uses debt/equity -ratio as a proxy for the risk of firm equity and finds 
positive relation between the expected stock returns and debt/equity -ratio when controlling 
for the beta and firm size. The highest coefficient was found when debt/equity -ratio was set 
as an explanatory variable together with beta and the firm size. Fama and French (1992) find 
support for Bhandari in that higher market leverage is positively related to average returns. 
However, they also find that higher book leverage correlates negatively with average returns. 
Fama and French explain the result of the opposite signs of relations with book-to-market
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ratio. They state that the ratio acts as a proxy for a firm’s financial distress risk that is not 
accounted in beta and captures the relative-distress risk but which can also be regarded as an 
involuntary leverage effect.
3.1.4. Analyst coverage and analyst expectations
Much academic research has concentrated on studying the future estimates and the accuracy 
of the forecasts of financial analysts. This is no surprise given that in a way the analysts’ 
consensus earnings estimates act as a proxy for what the whole market is expecting from 
public companies. In several stock valuation models the target stock prices are based on the 
expected future earnings, which again are often forecasted by an analyst. Hence, by making 
earnings forecasts, the analysts have an important role in influencing the current stock price 
and the future price movements.
Empirical evidence indicates that the stocks for which analysts have given the most 
pessimistic future earnings estimate earn significantly higher returns than stocks with the most 
optimistic analyst expectations6. Those that are expected to perform poorly but surprise the 
market positively will experience an overly positive market reaction. Similarly, the stocks 
with overly optimistic expectations are more likely to be overvalued and disappoint the 
market with a falling stock price or even negative abnormal returns.
A company not followed by analysts is typically smaller and more illiquid than the companies 
being followed by analysts. That is, companies with low analyst coverage tend to have more 
firm characteristics that can be classified as riskier than companies with high analyst 
coverage. This would suggest higher expected returns to compensate for the higher 
uncertainty and limited analysis on the company. Merton (1987) examines the expected return 
on ‘neglected’ stocks, that is, stocks that are less followed by the market. His theoretical 
finding is based on the notion that widely followed stocks (complete-information case) can be 
priced by the CAPM but in the incomplete-information case the market portfolio is not mean- 
variance efficient and hence the pricing does not follow the CAPM. Consequently, less 
followed stocks should in theory generate higher returns than more followed and better- 
known stocks. However, some empirical studies have proven the opposite. Brennan,
6 For several references (e.g. La Porta 1996, Ackert and Athanasakos 1997, and Ciccone 2003) see Helander 
(2005).
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Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) were the first to examine the effect of analyst following 
on equity returns. They do not find strong evidence suggesting outperformance of more 
followed stocks but they find that stocks followed by many analysts lead the prices of those 
that are less followed. Furthermore, they find that prices react to new information the quicker 
the more analysts follow the stock. In a recent study where the analyst coverage is measured 
by the number of EPS forecasts at any time over the period from 1990 to 2003, Helander 
(2005) finds results which imply that companies with high analyst coverage earn a premium 
over stocks that are less widely followed but otherwise similar.
3.1.5. Value vs growth stocks
La Porta, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) discuss the return differences between 
value and growth stocks and find evidence of market overreaction for earnings 
announcements in both value and growth stocks and in the direction that contradicts with the 
risk-based explanations for returns differentials. They agree with the BAPM of Shefrin and 
Statman (1994) in that unsophisticated investors often seem to go for the ‘good companies’ 
with a good record, as they perceive earnings growth in the past to indicate that the stock is a 
good investment. Based on the empirical evidence, La Porta et al find that the market only 
realizes their misevaluation of stocks on the day of earnings announcements and due to more 
positive earnings surprises for value stocks these stocks outperform the growth stocks, which 
in turn respond very negatively to the subsequent earnings announcements.
3.2. The effect of firm characteristics to investors’ return expectations
Taking a different approach into the widely used CAPM, Shefrin and Statman (1994) built a 
behavioural asset pricing model (BAPM) where asset prices are the outcome of interaction of 
information traders and noise trades. While information traders are aware of and understand 
the theory on the relation between firm characteristics and stock returns, noise traders make 
systematic cognitive errors in evaluating the relationship. By distorting the mean-variance 
efficient frontier suggested by CAPM, noise traders create abnormal returns to some 
securities. Hence, in BAPM the mean-variance portfolio is not the market portfolio as in 
CAPM but it is tilted to those stock types that noise traders prefer. According to behavioural 
asset pricing theory the noise traders believe that ‘good stocks are stocks of good and admired 
companies’. La Porta et al (1997) find results consistent with the behavioural theory as
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investors were found to prefer companies with superior past growth rate to value stocks as 
they see these to be good companies and hence good investments.
In order to recognize the characteristics that make investors to perceive companies as either 
good or bad, Shefrin and Statman (1995) studied how investors form their expectations on 
stock returns. The study is based on Fortune magazine’s annual surveys on company 
reputation. The results imply that respondents perceive large companies with low book-to- 
market ratios as good companies. Furthermore they perceive these good companies to be 
profitable investments and outperform the market in the long-term, which in most years 
contradicts with the evidence on realized returns. Continuing the work of Shefrin and 
Statman, Shefrin (2001) studied the relation between investors’ judgements on short-term 
return expectations and perceived risk on a scale of 1-10 or beta. He finds empirical evidence 
on investors’ return expectations that contradicts with the positive relation of risk and return - 
a cornerstone principle of financial theory. His study shows that even though financial 
professionals in principle may state that there is a positive relation between risk and returns, 
in practice investors make judgements that indicate a negative relation between the two. 
Investors are not explicitly asked whether the risk of an investment increases their return 
expectation but the cross-sectional structure of the expectations clearly shows that for 
example hedge fund managers expect higher returns from safer stocks. Shefrin notices that 
investors do associate book-to-market to correlate positively and firm size to correlate 
negatively with returns but yet implicitly investors expect higher returns from safer stocks. 
The analysis of results in the two studies both rely on the representativeness theory of 
Tversky and Kahneman7, which would explain the negative association between risk and 
return that investors seem to form. Findings from both Shefrin and Statman (1995) and 
Shefrin (2001) contradict with the empirical evidence of e.g. Chan and Chen (1991) and Fama 
and French (1992) on realized stock returns, as the two latter ones show that smaller 
companies with high book-to-market ratio tend to be those that outperform the market. Based 
on these four studies, it seems that book-to-market is positively related to realized returns but 
negatively related to investors’ return expectations. Similarly, firm size is negatively related 
to realized returns and positively related to expected returns.
7 Behavioural heuristic representativeness by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), which involves over-reliance on 
stereotypes. For more psychological biases and cognitive errors, see chapter 4.
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With respect to market capitalization, Brav et al (2005) find survey evidence for the size 
premium by using expected returns instead of realized returns. In their study, professionals 
expect smaller firms to generate higher returns than larger firms. That is, small capitalization 
is considered to be a risk factor over and above beta. However, they find no support for value 
stocks (=high book-to-market) having higher expected returns than growth stocks (=low 
book-to market). In fact, the sell-side analysts’ return expectations indicate negative 
coefficient on book-to-market, which is again the opposite of what e.g. Fama and French 
(1992) found but supports the BAPM. Brav et al also find that investors expect ‘winner 
stocks’, i.e. stocks with high past returns, to have lower returns in the future than will stocks 
with low or negative returns. Hence, there seems to be a correlation between recent returns of 
an asset and investors’ expectations but the correlation is the opposite to the findings resulted 
from using ex post returns. That is, according to Brav et al the momentum factor is negatively 
priced. Furthermore, their evidence shows a positive and highly significant relation between 
debt/equity -ratio and expected return, which suggests that leverage increases investors’ 
expected returns. This finding is in line with Bhandari (1988) and Fama and French.
Bloomfield and Michaely (2004) carried out two controlled experiments to study whether 
investors associate certain firm characteristics to returns because they believe that the 
characteristics affect the risk of an investment or because investors believe them to reflect 
mispricing. First, beta was found to be the most important risk factor but not a sign of 
mispricing. The participants stated that beta correlates positively with returns, which is in 
accordance with the CAPM. Second, market-to-book was seen as the most important indicator 
of mispricing although no abnormal returns in the short-term was expected of the mispricing. 
Moreover, the respondents linked high market-to-book to higher risk which contradicts with 
the CAPM but supports the behavioural models which also find the ratio to act as a sign of 
mispricing. Third, the participants acknowledged smaller firms to be riskier than larger firms 
but they do not expect the returns to be any different in firms of different size. The result with 
regards to the firm size is puzzling as higher risk usually leads to higher return expectations 
but in this case higher return is not expected to compensate for the size risk.
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4. PSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS IN DECISION-MAKING
Research in psychology suggests that a number of biases are likely to affect an individual’s 
behaviour. People tend to be optimistic on the future but also on their own ability to forecast, 
which indicates overconfidence. Furthermore, people tend to believe that others are more like 
themselves and that others’ opinions and forecasts are closer to their own ones than they 
really are (Thaler, 2000). Also, several experiments have proven that people cluster their 
answers around an anchor which can either be self-provided or disclosed. In forecasting future 
market returns, the anchor can be for example a disclosed historical average, a respondent’s 
own estimate on historical average or on average response (Welch, 2000; Kaustia, Alho, and 
Puttonen, 2006) or it could be something totally uninformative such as a respondent’s last 
four-digits of social security number (Chapman and Johnson, 1999). Both false-consensus 
effect and the anchoring effect are biases that have empirically been proven to affect decisions 
in several fields, both among students and among experienced professionals although less 
attention has been given to the significance of the biases among professionals. In some studies 
it has been shown that with experience and expertise an individual learns to avoid biases and 
hence the effect of manipulation among professionals is less evident yet existent than among 
students (e.g. Kaustia et al). However, Haigh and List (2005) find contradicting results in their 
experiment as the behaviour of traders is more biased than the behaviour of students.
This chapter provides background information for the empirical experiment that is carried out 
and gives examples on the psychological factors that affect opinions and forecasts in 
economics but also in other fields. The analysis of previous studies is done comprehensively 
in order to better justify the choices made in the survey design of this paper. It also gives an 
idea on the variety of factors that could affect the opinions and forecasts of professionals in 
financial industry. Unfortunately though, not all of them can be examined in the empirical 
study of this paper. In this chapter, framing effect (4.1) and anchoring effect (4.2) will be 
presented in more detail and other biases referred to in several contexts. Chapter 4.3 
concentrates on overconfidence and 4.4 goes through the factors that may affect the 
sensitivity to be affected by the biases.




The observation that decision-makers respond differently to normatively equivalent 
descriptions of the same problem is called framing effect. Redescribing exactly the same 
situation by using different verbal description, changing perspective or highlighting a 
different reference point for comparison in the options or in the outcome can even lead to 
preference reversals. Changes in preference that result from the framing effect have been a 
popular topic for research ever since Tversky and Kahneman first published their widely cited 
experiment on the Asian disease problem in 1981s. In the experiment there should not have 
been any systematic preference to any option as the expected outcome of all the options was 
the same. However, by simply shifting the reference point of the outcomes led to significant 
changes in the preference of choice. The central idea in their study is that the choice between 
options with equal expected value depend on whether the options are described in positive 
terms (lives saved) or in negative terms (lives lost).
The most popular domain in framing effect studies has been health, perhaps inspired by the 
study of Tversky and Kahneman. Also business and gambling have been popular domains for 
academic research on framing effect (see Kuhberger, 1998). A few of the more recent studies 
on framing effect have been focusing on classifying the effect rather than trying to prove its 
existence. They provide a useful basis on understanding the variety of studies accomplished 
on the framing effect. Levin, Schneider and Gaeth (1998) and Kuhberger have found
8 Since the original risky choice framing study by Tversky and Kahneman will be referred to in the text several 
times, it will be presented here as in 1981 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981, The Framing of Decisions and the 
Psychology of Choice. Science, p. 453-458; see Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). It also provides some 
background and understanding of the simplicity and significance of framing effect as a phenomenon.
Problem: Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to 
kill 600 people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that the exact 
scientific estimate of the consequences of the programs are as follows [The result of preferences in parentheses 
for each case]:
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. [72%]
If Program В is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will be saved and 2/3 probability that no people 
will be saved. [28%]
Which of the two programs would you favour?
Now consider this problem with a slightly different verbal description of the outcomes:
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. [22%]
If Program D is adopted, there is 1/3 probability that nobody will die and 2/3 probability that 600 people will 
die. [78%]
Which of the two programs would you favour?
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characteristics that tend to support the effect. Both studies have also been able to explain 
some contradicting results in earlier studies by distinguishing different types of the effect. By 
recognising the type of framing manipulation that has been used in a study, the average effect 
size of a bias in each category seems more evident. Both studies distinguish reference point 
framing from outcome salience framing and also suggest other categorizations. By 
distinguishing different types of framing as well as recognizing supporting characteristics in 
each type, understanding the framing effect in prior studies and planning studies that use the 
manipulation in future is more straightforward. The major types of framing will be presented 
here shortly to provide support for choices made in the empirical experiment of this paper.
4.1.1. Categorizing the types of framing effect
Levin et al (1998) categorized different kinds of framing effects into three subgroups based on 
what is framed, what is being affected and how the effect is measured.
о Risky choice framing (also prospect framing or reference point manipulation) which was 
first introduced by Tversky and Kahneman in 1981 is probably the form the most 
associated with the term ‘framing’. Typically the studies that fall into this category present 
a hypothetical decision scenario such as the one in the Asian disease problem with only 
two choice options of which one is a riskless prospect and the other is a two-outcome 
risky prospect with specified probabilities for the outcomes. In the positive frame the 
outcomes are framed as gains and in the negative frame as losses. In most studies, people 
tend to be more risk averse when the choices are positively framed. That is, people prefer 
to save 200 lives than to choose the risky option with the same expected outcome. But 
when the choices are negatively framed, people are more willing to take risk and prefer 
the risky choice to losing 400 lives (with the same expected outcome in both choices).
о In Attribute framing (also referred to as outcome salience) a characteristic of an object or 
an event serves as the focus of framing manipulation. That is, only a single feature is 
framed whereas in the risky choice framing all the options in an independent choice set 
are framed. Another fundamental difference between the two framing categories is that in 
attribute framing the presence of risk is not essential and thus there is no manipulation of 
risk either. Typically, positive framing of attributes leads to more favourable evaluations 
than negative framing. For example, consumers will most likely prefer 98% fat-free
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yogurt to 2% fat yogurt. Or survival rate of 60% sounds better for a patient’s ears than 
mortality rate of 40% before going to a surgery. Or 25/40 questions answered correct in an 
exam (success) sounds better than 15/40 (failure) answered wrong. In these examples 
there is no risky choice but instead a characteristic of a sentiment or a product is framed 
and that affects the evaluation.
о In Goal framing more than one aspect of the message can be framed but the goal of the 
messages will always remain the same. The key in goal framing is to affect the 
persuasiveness of communication and find the most persuasive impact on achieving a 
certain result. Depending on the situation, either positive or negative frame can have a 
greater persuasive impact. Sometimes it is better to stress the positive consequences of 
performing an act and sometimes the negative consequences of not performing the act. 
For example, consumers are found to be less willing to bear the cost of a surcharge for 
paying with credit card than to forego a discount for paying with cash. Hence, the prices 
should include the option to pay with credit card and in case you pay with cash you will 
get a discount rather than having lower prices and paying extra for credit card payments 
even though the outcome (the total price) will eventually be the same.
о Various experimental studies use other framing methods than the three presented above. 
For example in a gambling related decision scenario, some are told that they are ahead of 
others n previous gambles; others are told that they are behind n previous gambles. The 
additional information provided should not have an effect on the decision-making. 
However, some studies have proven that it leads to preference reversals (see Levin et al).
Kuhberger (1998) concentrated on analysing prior studies of risky choice framing. The meta­
analysis of 136 empirical papers shows that the overall framing effect for all studies 
collectively is of small to moderate size. However, the studies are highly heterogenic in tenns 
of the framing method employed, and also the effect size varies greatly between studies. To 
recognise the conditions that are apt to produce the framing effect, potentially relevant 
characteristics in each study were examined. The meta-analysis illustrates that the magnitude 
of the framing effect is highly dependent on the procedure and the methods used in a study. 
The characteristics can be divided into a few broad categories of which the two most 
important - risk characteristics and task characteristics - are presented here.
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о Risk characteristics can be divided into subcategories depending on the risk manipulation 
method, the quality of risk and the number of risky events used. First, the risk 
manipulation can be done by reference to a risky event such as in the Asian disease 
problem. It this case there is a risky event that comes up or does not come up in some 
probability in the future and the idea is to change the reference point in options. The risk 
manipulation can also be done by outcome salience where the notion of risk is applied to 
description of currently existing state that is labelled in two different ways (e.g. 80% 
survival rate vs. 20% mortality rate). Of these two, the former is found to have a strong 
framing effect whereas the latter only shows framing effect in a few studies. Second, the 
quality of risk can be presented in two ways. There can either be a sure option and a risky 
option or only risky options. The problem with having only risky options is that 
considering which one is more risky can be arbitrary and depend on the respondent. The 
sure/risky -model also used in the Asian disease problem supports the framing effect more 
than the risky/risky -model. Third, the studies differ in the number of risky events in 
alternatives. The effect size is stronger in single risk studies than in multiple risk studies.
о Task characteristics can also be subcategorized in order to provide further understanding 
on the differences in framing studies. First, the framing manipulation can be divided into 
two distinct forms. The manipulation can be done explicitly by changing the gain/loss 
wording or implicitly with task-responsive wording where no words that convey positive 
or negative meanings are used. After an outlier analysis framing manipulation methods 
have similar framing effect sizes. Second, large differences in effect size were found 
based on the response mode used in a study. The framing effect was found to be five times 
stronger in studies where respondents had to choose from options than in studies where 
respondents had to rate or judge something. Other distinctions between studies can be 
made based on the comparison method used (within-subject/between-subjects), on the unit 
of the analysis (individual level/group level) or on the domain studied.
In Kuhberger’s meta-analysis, the most efficient characteristics in predicting the effect size 
were risk manipulation, response mode and the quality of risk. Furthermore, a linear 
relationship was found between the effect size of a design and the similarity with the Asian 
disease design - the more similarities, the more efficient the design (R2 = 0.89).
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4.1.2. Framing effect in forecasting stock prices
Glaser, Langer, Reynders and Weber (2006) examined the framing effect in stock market 
predictions by submitting a survey among students in two German universities. They studied 
whether the results of asking for prices differ from results of asking for returns for seven 
individual stocks. For each stock, a price chart over the last six-month period was provided of 
which some were upward or downward sloping and some were fairly flat. The respondents 
were divided into three subgroups. The first subgroup was asked to forecast future price 
levels, the second subgroup to forecast future returns and the third group to forecast future 
returns but were also provided with more information on historical returns. Having past 
returns disclosed had no significant effect on the results. However, Glaser et al found a highly 
significant framing effect in using different elicitation modes (asking for price levels vs. 
asking for returns). For upward sloping stock price trends the estimated future returns were 
significantly higher in the group forecasting returns compared to the group forecasting prices. 
For downward sloping trends however, the estimated future returns were significantly lower 
in the ‘return forecast’ group than in the ‘price forecast’ group. Both the results are 
statistically significant at the 1% level.
4.2. Anchoring effect
In everyday judgments the anchoring effect describes the phenomenon where the construction 
of values is affected by an anchor or starting value. The basic idea behind the effect is that a 
decision maker first focuses on the anchor and then makes adjustments towards one’s final 
estimate. However, as the adjustments are not sufficient it means that the estimate will be 
biased toward the anchor. Thus far, the anchoring effect has been shown to exist in several 
fields such as in the pricing and rating of simple gambles, in the estimation of probabilities, in 
answers to factual knowledge questions and in predictions of future returns (see e.g. Chapman 
and Johnson, 1999). Anchoring is also described as a cause of preference reversals, which 
suggests that the anchoring effect would be closely related to framing effect described in the 
previous chapter.
Tversky and Kahneman (1974) were the first to introduce ‘the anchoring and adjustment’ 
phenomenon in their experiment where the estimates for the percentage of African nations in 
the UN were assimilated toward a given standard. The participants were first asked to
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evaluate whether the percentage of African nations in the UN was higher or lower than the 
disclosed anchor of either 10% (low anchor) or 65% (high anchor). In the second task, 
participants were asked to give their best estimate of the correct percentage of African nations 
in the UN. The average estimate of participants who had received the high anchor was 45% 
while the average estimate in the group of participants who had received the low anchor was 
only 25%. The results in classic experiment of Tversky and Kahneman and in many other 
earlier studies have however been questioned in terms of their significance in real life as the 
questions used in the experiments usually do not represent a realistic decision-making 
situation for most individuals. Yet, Kaustia et al (2006) found the classic framing effect to 
influence in the field of finance as well. Their experiment tested the effect of high anchor 
(20%) and low anchor (2%) in forecasting stock market returns. Kaustia et al find that both 
students and professionals were biased in the direction of the anchor as those who were 
exposed to the higher anchor show significantly higher future return estimates of 9.2% 
compared to 7.4% in the low-anchor group.
An anchor can be informative in that it provides information on e.g. the historical average or 
on the public opinion. Also an anchor without a numerical value has been proven to have an 
effect. Anchoring has been found to occur even when the anchor is obviously random or 
irrelevant, suggesting that activation of similar features does not occur merely because 
subjects think the anchor is informative. Several studies (e.g. Chapman and Johnson, 1999; 
Mussweiler and Strack, 1999) have found that the anchoring effect is in fact larger for 
implausible anchors than for plausible anchors. A plausible anchor is influencing the 
responses in real terms so that the estimates are anchored around it whereas an implausible 
anchor is first adjusted to a more appropriate comparison value and then the target object is 
compared to the selected standard, which in most cases will be more extreme than the 
plausible anchor. Hence, they find that the implausible anchor can even have a bigger effect 
on the final estimate. Even when subjects were told the direction in which the anchor would 
affect their responses, they were unable to avoid the bias (see Mussweiler and Strack). Using 
fund managers as subjects in an experiment, Montier (2006) finds that not even professional 
investors can avoid falling into the flaw of being affected by an obviously irrelevant anchor 
when asking for return forecasts. The fund managers were first asked to write down the last 
four digits of their phone number after which they were asked to estimate the number of 
doctors in London. Those whose last four digits of the phone number are above ‘7000’, on
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average estimated there to be 8000 doctors in London. Correspondingly, the fund 
managements with phone number below ‘3000’ on average estimate the number of doctors to 
be 4000. The influence of the frame is striking especially when without a doubt each 
respondent realises that phone number has nothing to do with what was being asked to 
estimate.
An anchor can be predetermined by a researcher or it can be a self-generated anchor by the 
respondent. Several studies (e.g. Welch, 2000; Kaustia et al, 2006) have found empirical 
evidence showing that both of the types of anchors have a significant effect on one’s 
responses. Welch (2000) studied the views of academic financial economists on the equity 
premium and on the perceived professional consensus on the premium. The results show that 
professionals perceive the consensus of the economists to be 0.5%-l% higher than it really is. 
In other words, they believe their colleagues’ forecasts on equity premium to be higher than 
they actually are. Moreover, Welch found evidence showing that financial economists 
anchored their forecasts on equity premium on the perceptions of the professional consensus 
(self-provided anchor). Thus it could be, that the equity premium estimated by a respondent is 
in fact a compromise between the respondent’s own opinion and one’s perception on the 
professional consensus estimate. Also, roughly a fifth gave a future equity premium estimate, 
which equalled to the historical average that was disclosed in the survey (predetermined 
anchor). In one of the experiments of Kaustia et al (2006) the subjects were first either 
provided a historical return of 4.5% over the past century or they were asked to give an 
estimate of their own on what the historical return in Europe has been over the past century. 
Then, all subjects were asked to forecast the future market return for the European markets. 
The average expectations (4.6% in the ‘disclosed’ group) imply that regardless of whether the 
historical return was disclosed or self-provided, the subjects anchor their future expectations 
strongly to the historical number. Interestingly, those who provided the historical number 
themselves expected nearly twice as high return rates than those who had the actual historical 
return disclosed.
Mussweiler and Strack (1999) examined the effect of anchors and change in the question 
wording. The respondents were either asked to indicate whether the target object is 
larger/older/higher than the anchor value or they were asked whether it is smaller/younger/ 
shorter than the anchor. The experiment is different to the one by Tversky and Kahneman
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(1974) on the number of African nations in UN in that instead of asking whether the correct 
answer is lower or higher than the anchor, they are now two separate questions. According to 
the theory on hypothesis-consistent testing, different forms of question should initiate a search 
for evidence in the given direction. That is, when participants are asked for e.g. whether 
Gandhi is older than 79, they should selectively search for evidence supporting that he is older 
than 79 and vice versa. As a result, absolute estimates should be higher in the ‘older’ 
condition than in the ‘younger’ condition. The anchors were either one standard deviation 
higher or lower than the mean estimates given by a calibration group. Half of the questions 
included a high anchor and the other half included a low anchor. Thus, four different question 
formats were created from the combination of high versus low anchors and ‘larger’ versus 
‘smaller’ question wording. Finally, the respondents were asked for an absolute estimate (e.g., 
‘How old is Gandhi?’). Overall, the respondents gave 21% (p<0.001) more outside-one- 
standard-deviation answers to the larger/smaller questions than calibration participants. The 
differences in comparative judgments were not dependent on the anchor or on the wording of 
the comparative question. High anchors led to significantly higher absolute estimates than low 
anchors. Also the absolute estimates were influenced by the comparative question in that 
higher estimates were made for the ‘older’ question than for the ‘younger’ question. This 
implies that the estimates were also dependent on the direction suggested by the question 
wording.
4.3. Overconfidence
Theoretical models in psychology studies have shown that overconfidence of an individual 
affects one’s behaviour in several fields. People tend to be overconfident about their own 
abilities and knowledge and the effect is found to be the most significant in difficult tasks 
such as forecasting with low predictability. Hence, the phenomenon has its effects on an 
individual’s behaviour in financial markets as well.
Various studies have shown that financial professionals on average are overconfident and 
suffer from optimism bias. Montier (2006) finds that 74% of fund managers perceive 
themselves as above average at their jobs while only a small minority believes that they are 
below the average. Lewellen, Lease, and Schlarbaum (1977) analyzed individual investors 
and found that overconfident individuals trade more, believe returns to be highly predictable 
and expect higher returns than what less confident people do. In a more recent study Odean
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(1998) finds consistent results in that overconfident investors trade more, as they believe their 
knowledge about the market and the asset valuation to be superior to other investors’. 
However, greater trading does not lead to better performance but it instead decreases the 
expected utility and net investment performance. This proves that an investor’s 
overconfidence can be of great damage for one’s wealth and more importantly a 
professional’s overconfidence can be very harmful for a client’s wealth. In the study of Glaser 
et al (2006; see also 4.1.2.) the German students who forecasted either future prices or future 
returns were also asked to give the upper and lower bound of a 90% confidence interval for 
their estimate. Compared to the historical volatility of the stocks the confidence intervals were 
too narrow, which suggests underestimation of volatility or overconfidence of the respondent. 
Overconfidence was significantly lower in the ‘return forecast’ group compared to the ‘price 
forecast’ group but the reason for this result is yet to be explored. Deaves, Lüders, and 
Schröder (2005) examined the overconfidence in making stock market expectations among 
German financial professionals. They find that the professionals are not just overly confident 
but that they also become more confident after being correct in the previous forecasts when 
measured by the 90% confidence level of forecasts. Interestingly, the adjustment to wider 
confidence interval after a failure to forecast accurately is smaller than the adjustment to a 
narrower confidence interval after a successful forecast. This can be explained by a well- 
known psychological phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, which suggests that people prefer 
to forget their failures and rather remember their successes of past performance.
Differences in the overconfidence between genders have also being proven to exist in 
empirical studies. Levellen et al (1977) and Barber and Odean (2001) find that men tend to 
behave more like a typical overconfident investor compared to women and hence to be more 
overconfident on average. Furthermore, men are found to feel more competent in male- 
dominated fields such as finance and to have riskier preferences than women (Barber and 
Odean).
4.4. Factors influencing the sensitivity to be exposed to behavioural biases
Prior empirical research shows that demographic and socioeconomic factors have an influence 
on individual’s behaviour in several fields, including financial markets. Using the same 
database as Barber and Odean (2001), Komiotis and Kumar (2006) find support for previous 
studies that have empirically proven the relation between overconfidence and age. They find
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that older investors have better knowledge about investing and hold less risky and more 
diversified portfolio. Simultaneously however, investment skill itself deteriorates with age, 
which leads to lower risk-adjusted returns. The finding is consistent with the theoretical 
predictions of lifecycle models and learning models, which underline the positive effect of 
experience as well as with psychological evidence on aging, which suggests that cognitive 
abilities decline with age. Komiotis and Kumar also find that the negative age effect is less 
apparent in the group of individuals with higher education and higher income. 
Overconfidence decreases with age and hence it is the young investors that have the largest 
overconfidence on one’s own knowledge.
The empirical evidence in several studies shows that experts and other more sophisticated 
individuals suffer less from behavioural biases such as the anchoring effect. Kaustia et al 
(2006) finds that expertise indeed decreases the effect of behavioural biases. In their study, 
students show a significantly higher anchoring effect than financial professionals. Moreover, 
they find less sophisticated students to anchor their return estimates more than the group of 
more sophisticated students. Yet, it seems that there are limits to sophistication too as 
regardless of the level of expertise or length of work experience no difference among the 
professionals was found. In the framing study of Glaser et al (2006) a further comparison 
between students who study finance and those who do not study finance shows that financial 
education decreases the effect of framing. That is, the difference between asking for prices 
and asking for returns is smaller in the group of more sophisticated students. Moreover, more 
sophisticated students were less overoptimistic than other students. Yet, not all studies have 
agreed with Kaustia et al and Glaser et al in that expertise decreases the risk of being affected 
by psychological biases. Contrary to prior studies, Haigh and List (2005) find a behavioural 
anomaly to be even stronger among professional derivatives traders than among 
undergraduate students in their experiment of betting behaviour. This only suggests that more 
research is needed in the field of behavioural finance to determine what role expertise plays in 
professionals’ decisions and market expectations.




In order to provide answers to the research questions introduced in chapter 1.2 a large-sample 
survey among investment advisors was carried out. The results of the survey provide 
investment advisors’ views on the future stock market returns and evidence on the underlying 
factors behind the return expectations. The effect of framing manipulation is tested in an 
experiment in order to find out whether psychological factors affect investment advisors’ 
opinions on the relations between certain firm characteristics and future stock returns. A 
descriptive analysis on the Finnish investment advisors and their work9 is also provided. 
Before the analysis of results, chapters 5.1 - 5.3 describe methodology, data, survey design 
and data cleaning. Chapter 5.4 goes through the main descriptive statistics on Finnish 
investment advisors. Return expectations for the European markets and the emerging markets 
are reported and analysed in chapter 5.5. After first going through the overall return 
expectations and the perceived professional consensus, the chapter analyses the expected 
returns conditional to demographic variables. Also, the sources of information that investment 
advisors use in making the return forecasts are examined. Chapter 5.6 introduces the results of 
the experiment regarding the relations between firm characteristics and stock return forecasts 
of investment advisors. With regards to firm characteristics, the results are mainly examined 
in view of the framing effect. Finally, chapter 5.7 brings the empirical research to a close by 
discussing the shortcomings of the study.
5.1. Data and methodology
The empirical research was carried out by using a web-based survey targeted to Finnish 
investment advisors. The survey was sent to 1465 investment advisors who have passed the 
first level examination organised by FASD as at 20.05.2005 and have given permission to use 
their contact details for research purposes. Those investment advisors who have not passed 
the test were excluded. Even though the sample will be somewhat biased in that only the ones 
that have passed the examination are included in the sample, it is not clear whether the results 
would be any different if the sample comprised of all investment advisors. There is no reason 
to believe that those who have attended the examination would be any different to those who
9 Although it later became clear that the title of some of the respondents is not ‘investment advisor’, for 
simplicity the entire group is referred to as investment advisors in this survey. In fact, the descriptive analysis is 
broadly on those who have passed the first-level FASD examination.
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have not, as most commonly it is the employer who decides whether the employees should 
attend.
The main idea in designing the cover letter that was sent by email and the survey layout 
online was to make them as appealing and respondent-friendly as possible in order to achieve 
as high a response rate and as credible results as possible. The survey was carried out as a 
web-based questionnaire in which both multiple choice and open-ended questions were used. 
Before the final questionnaire was determined, the questions were tested with a small group 
of investment advisors who gave their ideas for improving the clarity and relevance of the 
questions. For example, the initial questionnaire posed the questions on expected market 
premium instead of expected market returns. As the term ‘market premium’ is not widely 
used in investment advisors’ daily work and it could induce different interpretations of the 
term, the questions were posed in terms of expected stock market returns. Furthermore, the 
online system was tested in order to prevent any problems one could face when answering the 
questionnaire.
The participants were notified on the research by e-mail, which had a link to the 
questionnaire. The participants were given time to answer the questionnaire from 18.5.2006 to 
31.5.2006. As at 27.5.2006 a new question was added regarding a respondent’s current 
position and a reminder was sent to those who had not yet responded to the questionnaire. By 
extending the deadline, those who had been out-of-office but returned to work before the 
deadline and those who were not sure whether the survey was targeted to them were also able 
to participate in the survey. Out of the 1465 emails sent, 368 were either undeliverable or the 
recipient was out-of-office for the whole period during which the survey was carried out. 
Hence, 1097 emails were finally delivered during the period to 31.5.2006. The questionnaire 
was answered 762 times. After filtering out some double answers10 and those who had 
answered the questionnaire but had not passed the first level FASD examination the total 
number of respondents was 742, which is 68% of those who received the email by 31.5.2006. 
Given the very high response rate of the survey, the risk of non-response bias is small.
10 For example some had started the survey by first answering a few questions but then quit the survey and 
started all over again later. In these cases the first time a participant has answered is ignored.
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With regards to the analysis of professional consensus, the consensus expectation as well as 
the perceived expectation among investment advisors is simply given by the arithmetic 
average of all expectations. Also an average, which excludes the highest return expectations is 
provided in order to prevent the effect of overly optimistic expectations. The false-consensus 
effect is measured by comparing the real professional consensus and the perceived 
professional consensus. The significance of the bias is then tested with the standard two- 
sample t-test on difference11. All comparisons between demographic groups are done 
similarly by comparing the arithmetic average expectations among certain groups and then 
testing the significance with the standard two-sample t-test on difference.
In addition, a regression analysis is used to further examine some of the results on expected 
returns. First, a logistic regression is used to find out which variables affect one’s perceived 
ability to make return forecasts. The level of confidence is used as a dependent variable and 
demographic factors and the employer of an investment advisor are used as explanatory 
variables. Second, a linear regression analysis is carried out to determine which variables of 
an investment advisor affect one’s long-term return forecast for the European stock markets. 
The long-term return expectation for the European markets is used as a dependent variable 
and demographic factors, employer as well as the confidence level of an advisor are used as 
explanatory variables. The same regression model with small changes is run for certain 
subgroups. The regression models itself as well as all the results are described in more detail 
in relation to the regression analyses.
With regards to the third part of the survey where the effect of firm characteristics to 
investment advisors’ expected returns is examined, some statistical tests and regression 
analyses are also carried out. First, the chi-square goodness-of-fit test12 measures whether 
there are statistically significant differences between different framing settings. That is, the
t = x\ -xi —Ö »
ÍL + Í1
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test computes whether any statistically significant evidence on framing effect can be found in 
this study. Second, the test measures whether the results of two framing settings could be 
combined and regarded as one group. The analysis is also carried out for the subgroup of 
investments advisors who can be regarded as experts.
5.2. Survey design
In the beginning of the survey, the participants are instructed to respond to all the questions 
based on their own opinions. Also, in the questions related to return expectations and the 
relations between firm characteristics and return forecasts more specified instructions on 
answering the questions were provided. The questions on expected returns were posed in a 
way, which an investment advisor would face them in his daily work - that is, in a situation 
where a client asks for the investment advisor’s view on expected returns. The number of 
questions was limited to minimum so that answering the questionnaire would only take five 
minutes of a respondent’s time and consequently more people would have time to participate 
in the survey. After answering the survey, the respondents had a choice of taking part in a 
lottery where three randomly selected participants won a book price. Also, for those interested 
in the results, a summary of the main results was provided. The questionnaire was carried out 
in Finnish and can be found in Appendix 2a. The survey is also translated in English in 
Appendix 2b. The original questions with layout of the online-based survey can be found in a 
test version at http://www.survevmonkev.com/s.asp?u=5767226638513. The structure of the survey is 
broadly divided into three sections.
The first part of the survey poses questions on demographic factors of the respondent as well 
as questions on his or her work experience, current employer, personal clients and meetings. 
The questions on demographic factors, work experience and employer were posed so that 
potential correlations between any single factor and responses for the questions in the second 
and the third section could be revealed. For example, the analysis reveals whether the return 
expectations are any different in the group of university graduates compared to those with a 
lower education. Similarly, the analysis compares the return expectations of different age
13 The test version and the appendices include the first and the second format of the questions on the relationship 
between firm characteristics and expected stock returns to introduce the different framing formats, which are 
further explained later in this chapter.
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groups and genders. In addition, the responses to the questions in the first section are used in a 
descriptive analysis on Finnish investment advisors.
The second section asks the respondents to forecast the future average returns in European 
stock markets (EU-15) and the emerging stock markets. In questions 13 and 15 the 
respondents are asked to predict the annual average stock returns in short-term (1-year) and 
long-term (20-year) horizons for both European stock markets and the emerging stock 
markets. Question 14 asks respondents to predict how other investment advisors would advise 
their clients in question 13 regarding the average future returns in European stock markets. 
Question 14 is designed to demonstrate how an investment advisor sees his colleagues to 
predict future returns. It also shows whether investment advisors on average are more 
optimistic or pessimistic than they think they are on future stock market returns. Furthermore, 
the question will test whether or not their own predictions are anchored to their perception of 
other investment advisors’ forecasts. The respondents are also asked to indicate which sources 
of information they use when determining the expectations on the future stock market returns. 
Alternatives for the sources of information are provided but one can also choose a source 
outside the seven alternatives offered. Finally, question 17 asks the respondents’ perception of 
one’s own ability to forecast future returns compared to other investment advisors. This 
question is posed in order to find out whether for example higher education or certain 
employer increases an investment advisor’s perceived ability to make market return forecasts. 
It also shows if an investment advisor on average perceives him self as better or as worse at 
making forecasts of future returns than his colleagues, which would either reflect an average 
overconfidence or lack of confidence on an investment advisor’s ability to forecast. The 
potential differences in market forecasts between these ‘confidence groups’ will be tested as 
well.
I
The third section of the survey focuses on propositions on whether a certain firm 
characteristic affects the expected future return of a stock and if it does, is the effect positive 
or negative. A series of four propositions comprise of evaluating the following firm 
characteristics and their effect on returns: liquidity, leverage, growth prospects of a company 
and analyst coverage in terms of the number of analysts following the company. Liquidity 
was selected as one of the characteristics to be assessed, as it is commonly known and 
discussed variable of a stock investment. It is also one of the factors that have been
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acknowledged to be related to the size effect of an asset as discussed in 3.1.1. Furthermore, 
liquidity was selected over firm size as the size of a firm is less acquainted as a risk factor and 
yet they are closely related (Amihud, 2002). Another well-known risk factor of a company is 
the debt/equity -ratio. Many studies (e.g. Bhandari, 1988; Fama and French, 1992) as well as 
the financial theory have shown that the expected return should increase with leverage. To test 
whether Finnish investment advisors agree with this in practice, a question on the relation 
between leverage and return was included in the survey. It has been acknowledged that 
investors tend to prefer stock of ‘good companies’ as investments. In some studies however 
(see Helander, 2005), it has been shown that growth prospects correlate negatively with 
realized returns. The consensus expectation among analysts is selected to this survey to test 
whether the growth prospects affect the return expectations of investment advisors and if it 
does, to what direction. To test whether the empirical evidence of Helander (2005) on the 
positive relation between the number of analysts following a company and stock return holds 
among investment advisors, the analyst coverage is also included in the experiment.
To analyse the relation between firm characteristics and expected returns on an asset 
comprehensively, three different formats on the propositions were formed so that one 
respondent only answered in a series of one format of propositions. The use of three different 
formats of the same propositions was done in order to reveal whether the framing effect exists 
in evaluating the relationship between firm characteristics and stock returns. That is, it tests 
whether the wording or the point of view in the proposition affects the response. The first 
format (Framing 1) has a different point of view compared to the two other formats (Framing 
2 and Framing 3). The first one asks about the effect of firm characteristics on the required 
stock return whereas the two latter ones ask the effect of firm characteristics on the stock 
return expectations. The required return and the return expectation should result in the same 
conclusion in each proposition, that is, regardless of the point of view. Framings 2 and 3 only 
differ from each other in the wording of the characteristics. The instructions for answering 
were the same for all, only the propositions slightly differ. Everyone was asked to consider a 
situation where a company is an average company in all other terms except one mentioned in 
the question. In Framing 1 the respondents were simply asked to answer yes or no. For 
example:
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In order to invest in a stock of a company that is more leveraged than average, I would 
require higher than average return. [Yes/No]
The order and the wording of the propositions were the same for all in Framing 1. Framings 2 
and 3 are similar to each other except that as propositions in Framing 2 are about liquidity, 
high leverage, good growth prospects and less analysts following a company, the propositions 
in Framing 3 are about illiquidity, low leverage, poor growth prospects and more analysts 
following a company. That is, the opposite firm characteristics are used in the Framing 2 
compared to the Framing 3. In the latter two formats, the order of the characteristics was 
randomized so that the question about the effect of e.g. liquidity would not always be the first 
one to be asked. The question for each proposition was the same. For example:
How would the following firm characteristics affect your view on the expected future return 
for a stock?
A company has more debt than average [Higher return/Lower return/No effect]
The investment advisors were randomly divided into three groups of same size, which were 
formed in such a way that the groups were as similar as possible. In order to make the 
subgroups alike, the foreknowledge on the investment advisors was used in the 
randomization. The groups were equalised in terms of the year when the first-level FASD 
examination was passed [2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005], gender, employer [Sampo, Nordea 
OKO, Aktia, Säästöpankki, other]14, year of birth [1941-1958, 1959-1966, 1967-1982] and 
hometown [Helsinki, other] so that none of these factors could affect the potential differences 
in results between the different framing formats used in the experiment. Although the setting 
where subjects are manipulated by using different frames might seem ‘unfair’ as the 
respondents are not told the real motivation of the experiment, in reality different clients ask 
similar questions in a varying way as well. Hence, there are valid implications for practical 
situations too from the experiment.
14 In the analysis of the results, the banks have been renamed as Bank A, Bank B... Bank E, Other. The banks are 
not renamed in any specific order and the first option in the questionnaire (Nordea) or in the list above (Sampo) 
is not necessarily Bank A. However, once a bank has been renamed as e.g. Bank D, it will be Bank D throughout 
the analysis. Other refers to those who are working for a smaller employer outside the options that were given in 
the questionnaire.




Several steps were taken in cleaning the data before the analysis of the return estimates took 
place. Most importantly, the responses for the expected returns in stock markets had to be 
trimmed so that all the responses would be in the same format. Only one numerical answer for 
each return expectation was being asked and hence all comments made regarding the future 
returns were ignored in the analysis. In cases where a respondent had answered a range of the 
return expectation, an average expectation within the range was taken and included in the 
analysis. A few responses were modified to adhere to the survey format. Furthermore, some 
respondents had evidently misread the question regarding the long-term returns and hence the 
answers most likely reflected their expectation over the 20-year period instead of the annual 
return, which was asked for. In some cases however, it was unclear whether or not the long­
term expectation of a respondent was given on an annual basis or over the whole period. 
These were treated case-sensitively by looking at the expectations as a whole and then 
determining whether the misunderstanding of a question is likely. For example a respondent 
who expects the short-term return for the European markets to be 20-50% and the long-term 
average annual return to be 50% is very optimistic on the future returns but most likely has 
not misunderstood the question. In turn, a respondent who expects the short-term return to be 
2% and the long-term return to be 40% has more likely estimated the long-term return over 
the 20-year period rather than on an annual basis as the difference between the estimates is so 
immense. Hence, the latter respondent’s short-term expectation is included but long-term 
expectation excluded in the analysis and the former respondent’s expectations are both taken 
into account (short-term expectation as an average of the range given = 35%).
5.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive statistics on Finnish investment advisors. Overall those 
who responded to the survey represent well the 1465 people who have passed the first level 
FASD examination (and given permission to use their contact details). Out of the 742 who 
responded to the survey 67% are females and 32% males15. Although the finance field is 
widely regarded as male dominated, the fact that two thirds of the respondents in this survey 
are females does not surprise given that 65% of those who have passed the FASD
15 The percentages do not all add up to 100% due to rounding and the fact that not all respondents have answered 
all questions.
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examination are females as well. 53% of the respondents have a higher (after high school) 
education. Interestingly though, the educational background is different among men than 
women. 77% of men have a university or university equivalent degree whereas only 43% of 
women have a higher education. All respondents had passed the first level FASD examination 
by 20.5.2005 and 20% has also passed the second level FASD examination during 2001-2006. 
Although only 53% of the respondents say they have not passed the FASD II, it is likely that 
most of those who did not respond the question have not passed the examination. Hence, the 
percentage of those who have not passed FASD II is likely to be closer to 80% than 53%. 
47% are currently working for Bank A, 18% for Bank C and 10% for Bank D. The 
domination of Bank A employees was expected as nearly half of those who have passed the 
first level FASD examination are from Bank A (48%). An average respondent is 44 years old 
and has 6 years of experience in investment advising. Yet it should be noted that not all of the 
respondents are currently working as investment advisors and therefore the average 
experience could to some extent measure the work experience in banking or finance.
Table 1 The background of Finnish investment advisors
The table presents the descriptive statistics of Finnish investment advisors in terms of gender, employer, 
education, FASD II examination, age and work experience. Responded and N refer to those participants out of 
the total of 742 who answered each question. % of total is the percentage of respondents in each category out of 
all 742 respondents.
Respondents______  ______ Respondents
BY GENDER: by category % of total BY FASD: by category % of total
Women 498 67% Not passed FASD II 392 53%
Men 241 32% Passed FASD II 147 20%
Responded 739 100% Responded 539 73%
No response 3 0% No response 203 27%
Respondents Respondents
BY EMPLOYER: by category % of total BY EDUCATION: by category % of total
Bank A 352 47% Comprehensive school 50 7%
Bank В 29 4% Vocational school 171 23%
Bank C 132 18% high school grad 115 15%
Bank D 73 10% University equiv. grad 210 28%
Bank E 26 4% University graduate 184 25%
Other 63 8% Responded 730 98%
Responded 675 40% No response 12 2%
No response 67 9%
(years) Average Min Max Mode Median N
AGE 44 23 64 41 44 740
EXPERIENCE 6 0 33 5 5 591
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In order to get an idea on the magnitude of the investment advising industry in Finland, the 
respondents were asked to estimate the number of personal customers they manage and the 
number of investment conversations with clients as well as an average time they spend with 
one customer per meeting. Although a large portion of the respondents do investment 
advising only part-time along with other tasks or do not have any contact with clients at the 
moment, the responses that were collected give an idea on the business. Half of the 
respondents said that they have less than 100 customers under management, which indicates 
that they either do no investment advising at the moment or only do it when there is need16. 
Hence, as some of the respondents do not operate as investment advisors and might not have 
client contacts, these numbers could be somewhat downwards biased compared to the group 
of those working as full-time investment advisors. 23% has 100-200 customers whereas only 
12% have more than 400 customers. What is meant with a client was not explained and hence 
it could be the case that for example some consider a family as one client and other as several 
clients depending on the size of a family. As far as the personal contacts with clients are 
concerned, a third of investment advisors have less than 100 investment conversations with 
clients annually. The low number of contacts can again be explained with the fact that not all 
respondents work directly in the investment advising. Roughly another third talks to clients 
100-300 times a year with regards to investment issues and the rest have more than 300 
conversations a year. The time an investment advisor spends with one client varies quite 
extensively. One reason could be that some consider a phone conversation as a client meeting 
whereas other only count personal meetings as a contact with a client. Without further 
analysis on the issue, it could be the case that those who include conversations on the phone 
as meetings have shorter average time of a meeting, as it seems logical that a personal 
meeting takes more time. On average one meeting or conversation between an investment 
advisor and a client lasts for 49 minutes but most typically it lasts for an hour. Figure 1 shows 
the distribution of average duration of meetings.
16 For example the managers of regional banks might take care of customers in need for investment advice, as 
there is no need for a full-time adviser. Hence, the manager has some client contact throughout the year but the 
number of clients does not exceed 100.
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Figure 1 Distribution of client meeting durations
Figure shows the distribution of investment advisors’ average duration of a client meeting. The average 
durations are classified by every 10 minutes. The frequency gives the percentage of responses for each class. 
' N=596.
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5.5. Investment advisors’ return expectations
Perhaps the most commonly asked question from an investment advisor is ‘how much will the 
stock markets return in the future?’ Although it goes without saying that no investment 
advisor or other professional can give a correct answer to the question, it is yet a subject in 
which the investment advisors give their views or recommendations on a daily basis. For that 
reason, it is interesting to find out what the investment advisors on average expect and how 
the expectations vary between subjects. To find out the consensus of investment advisors on 
the expected stock market returns in European markets and in the emerging markets the 
respondents were asked to give their return forecasts for the two market areas in both short­
term and long-term investment horizons. In addition, the investment advisors’ perception of 
the professional consensus was asked to find out whether the investment advisors suffer from 
false-consensus effect.
This study shows that the market expectations of investment advisors vary significantly 
between subjects and between demographic groups. That is, depending on the gender, 
education, age and even employer of the investment advisor, an average recommendation a 
client receives when asking for investment advice can be significantly different. Furthermore,
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the results are similar to Welch (2000) in that the real professional consensus differs 
significantly from the perceived consensus and hence the professionals on average suffer from 
false-consensus effect. Interestingly, both the overall results and without an exception all the 
analyses in subgroups show that investment advisors are expecting European stock markets as 
well as the emerging markets to underperform the upcoming 20-year average annual return 
during the next 12 months. Also, overall and by subgroups investment advisors are expecting 
stock markets to realize positive returns both in short-term and long-term. Chapters 5.5.1 and 
5.5.2 go through the overall real professional consensus for both European markets and the 
emerging markets as well as the perceived professional consensus for European markets. 
After that, investment advisors’ perceptions on own ability to forecast are analysed in chapter
5.5.3. Chapter 5.5.4 looks at the professional consensus conditional to the characteristics of 
investment advisors.
5.5.1. Consensus for the European markets
The realized return data for the EU-15 area during the past few years shows that on an annual 
basis the market has been highly volatile in the recent years. The annual return for the 
European markets has varied between -34.0% and +24.6% during the last four years17. The 
high variance of annual returns also suggests that predicting future returns is a difficult task 
with very low predictability. Hence, it is no surprise to find that the return expectations of 
investment advisors in this study vary significantly as well. Table 2 summarizes the results for 
European market expectations. The table gives data on both the real professional consensus as 
well as the perceived professional consensus for short-term and long-term. The consensuses 
are measured by arithmetic average of returns and by mode and median terms in order to 
better describe the expectations of the advisors. The number of respondents who gave their 
return expectations is lower than the number of survey participants due to non-response and in 
case of long-term expectation also as a result of data cleaning (see 5.3)18.
17 The historical return based on S&P Euro Plus Index, which was launched in 2001. The index covers the stock 
markets of all euro zone countries as well as Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Switzerland. The annual returns are 
YTD to 31“ December each year in 2002-2005.
18 To test whether the non-response and data cleaning is related to any advisor characteristic, a regression 
analysis was carried out. The analysis shows that those who perceive themselves to be better than average 
forecasters have given return expectation relatively more often than other advisors (p<0.01). In turn, women tend 
to pass the question more often than men (p<0.001). It is unclear why the gender effect exists in this case. One 
explanation could be that those who would have given lower return expectations have passed the question which 
again would explain the higher average return expectations by women compared to men (see 5.5.4).
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Table 2 Return expectations for European markets
The table presents the average stock market return expectations for European markets. The expectations are 
given in short-term and long-term both in terms of real professional consensus and perceived consensus. 
Expected refers to the expected returns by the investment advisors and perceived refers to the perceived 
professional consensus. Average refers to the arithmetic average of all responses, average <25% is the arithmetic 
average of responses conditional on being <25% and similarly average <30% is the arithmetic average of 
responses conditional on being <30%. That is, in the two latter ones responses that are over 25% and 30% 
respectively are excluded in the average. Median, mode, minimum and maximum expectations are of all 





<30% Median Mode Min Max Variance N
Europe 1-year
Expected 5.74 5.63 5.68 5.00 5.00 -20.00 35.00 29.62 481
Perceived 8.30 7.96 8.16 7.50 10.00 -10.00 40.00 35.00 438
Europe 20-years
Expected 10.10 9.52 9.68 9.00 8.00 0.00 50.00 22.93 512
Perceived 12.00 11.06 11.44 10.00 10.00 0.00 50.00 37.52 460
Overall, Finnish investment advisors expect the market to realize a positive return of 5.7% 
over the next 12 months. In median and mode terms as well as in average terms when the 
highest expectations are excluded, the expected return in the short-term is only slightly lower. 
The professional consensus for the short-term return expectation is slightly above the average 
return of 4.0% in European markets during the past four years and the historical average of 
4.5% over the last century in Europe19. It is however considerably lower than the average 
annual return of 9.9% over the last 10 years20. Hence, it is difficult to say whether the 
investment advisors have anchored their estimates to some historical return number, as the 
average historical return is highly dependent on the time period used for measuring the 
historical average. In the long-term horizon investment advisors expect European stock 
markets to realize returns of more than 10% per annum over the next 20 years21, which
19 The long-term historical return based on Dimson et al (2002).
20 MSCI Europe Index as at 31st May 2006.
21 Throughout the analysis of long-term expected returns it should be kept in mind that some of the advisors’ 
forecasts might be total return expectations for the 20-year period instead of annual expectations. The most 
evident error answers have been ignored in the analysis. However, in some cases it is highly difficult to evaluate 
whether a respondent has meant the expectation in annual terms or as a total return. Therefore, it is possible that 
the average long-term expectations for both European markets and emerging markets are slightly lower than 
what the average numbers in the analysis suggest. However, the effect should not be significant as the number of 
the unclear responses is limited.
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coincides well with the realized average annual return of 9.9% during the past 10 years. In the 
long-term expectations, the mode and median expectations are somewhat lower than the 
professional consensus in average terms. This could in part be explained by the assumption 
that some have forecasted the equity return over the whole 20-year period instead of on an 
annual basis. Yet, even the averages, which exclude the highest expectations, are close to the 
overall long-term average return expectation.
Consistent with the term structure in Welch’s (2000) study the term structure of return 
expectations is monotonically increasing in time. The annual expectations for the European 
stock markets are higher for the long-term period, which indicates that investment advisors 
see that over the next 12 months European markets will underperform its average annual 
return of the next 20 years. Although the term structure was found to be similar as in Welch’s 
study, there is yet an interesting difference as well. Welch found the expected short-term 
equity premia expectation to be less volatile than the long-term expectations. However, this 
study finds the opposite, as the investment advisors’ long-term expectations for the European 
market are less volatile than the short-term expectations. Logically thinking the finding makes 
sense, as short-term returns have historically been more volatile than the long-term average 
returns. The range in the forecasts for both short-term and long-term are fairly wide yet 
reasonable given the recent high volatility in annual European market returns. The short-term 
expectations in this survey vary between -20% and +35%; in the long-term the average 
annual return of the market is expected to be between 0% and 50%. It is worth noticing that 
no investment advisor believes the market to realize negative return over the 20-year period.
Looking at the perceived consensus estimates both in short-term and long-term, one can 
conclude that investment advisors suffer from false-consensus effect in both time periods. 
The results regarding false-consensus effect support the findings of Welch (2000). That is, on 
average an investment advisor believes his or her colleagues to expect higher equity returns in 
future than they really do. Also, an average investment advisor believes the professional 
consensus to be higher than what it really is. The one-year perceived consensus on stock 
returns is 8.3% which is statistically significantly higher the real consensus of 5.7% (t=6.79, 
pO.001). Correspondingly in the long-term, the investment advisors’ perceived consensus for 
the annual returns is 12.0% and the real consensus only 10.1% (t=5.36, pO.001). This means 
that on average investment advisors believe that his or her colleagues are considerably more
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optimistie on future stock market returns than they really are, both in short-term and long­
term horizon. Interestingly though, the median perceived consensus for the short-term 
expectations was 7.5% whereas the most common answer (mode) was as high as 10.0% (and 
the average perceived consensus 8.3%). In the long-term consensus forecasts, both the median 
and mode were 10.0%, which in fact are close to the real consensus of 10.1% but are both far 
below the average perceived consensus of 12.0%. In mode and median terms, the conclusions 
on the existence of the false-consensus effect remain the same as in mean terms but the effect 
size of the bias varies depending on which measure of ‘centre’ is used in the analysis. Figures 
2 and 3 give the distributions of return estimates for European markets in short-term and long­
term respectively.
■ Expected annual returns
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Figure 2 Distribution of short-term return expectations for European markets
The figure shows the distribution of investment advisors’ expected short-term returns and perceived consensuses 
for the European markets. The first histogram is given by the return expectations for each class (by every two 
percentage points). The second histogram is given by the perceived professional consensus estimates. Both 
estimates are on a 12-month horizon. N(expected retum)=481, N(perceived professional consensus)=438.
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Figure 3 Distribution of long-term return expectations for European markets
The figure shows the distribution of investment advisors’ expected long-term returns and perceived consensuses 
for the European markets. The first histogram is given by the return expectations for each class (by every two 
percentage points). The second histogram is given by the perceived professional consensus estimates. Both 
estimates are on a 20-year horizon. N(expected return)=512, N(perceived professional consensus)=460.
5.5.2. Consensus for the emerging markets
Overall it can be noticed that investment advisors perceive the emerging markets to be far 
more profitable as an investment than European markets both in short-term and long-term as 
the expected returns are considerably higher. Moreover, it seems that forecasting returns in 
the emerging markets is far more difficult than for European markets, which can be concluded 
by simply comparing the standard deviations and ranges of expectations in the two markets. 
Table 3 summarizes the findings for both the emerging markets and European markets to 
make the comparisons more straightforward.
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Table 3 Return expectations for European markets and the emerging markets
The table presents the investment advisors’ average return expectations on both European markets and the 
emerging markets in short-term and long-term. For European markets, the expectations are given both in terms 
of real professional consensus and perceived consensus. Expected refers to the expected returns by the 
investment advisors and perceived refers to the perceived professional consensus. Average refers to the 
arithmetic average of all responses, average <25% is the arithmetic average of responses conditional on being 
<25% and similarly average <30% is the arithmetic average of responses conditional on being <30%. That is, in 
the two latter ones return expectations that are over 25% and 30% respectively are excluded in the average. 






<30% Median Mode Min Max Variance N
Europe 1-year 
Expected 5.74 5.63 5.68 5.00 5.00 -20.00 35.00 29.62 481
Perceived 8.30 7.96 8.16 7.50 10.00 -10.00 40.00 35.00 438
Europe 20-years 
Expected 10.10 9.52 9.68 9.00 8.00 0.00 50.00 22.93 512
Perceived 12.00 11.06 11.44 10.00 10.00 0.00 50.00 37.52 460
Emerging markets 
1-year 11.60 8.24 9.72 10.00 10.00 -40.00 80.00 172.10 449
20-years 15.36 12.87 13.28 12.00 10.00 -1.50 80.00 96.62 487
The average return expectations for the emerging markets are statistically significantly higher 
than the expectations for European markets, both in the short-term (t=8.78, pO.OOl) and in 
the long-term (t=10.7, p<0.001). On average investment advisors expect the emerging 
markets to return 11.6% in the short-term and 15.4% in the long-term. The short-term return 
expectation for emerging markets is twice as much as what the expectation for European 
markets is when measured by not just the average expectations but also by the median and 
mode expectations. In addition, the variance of the short-term expectations in the emerging 
markets is nearly six-fold to the variance of the short-term European market expectations and 
also the range of expectations is considerably wider. This can be explained by the supposition 
that the short-term predictability of the emerging markets is even lower than that of European 
markets. Although it was expected that the variance in expectations would be higher for the 
less familiar and historically more volatile emerging markets, the difference in variances of 
expectations is yet surprisingly high. As with the short-term return expectations, the annual 
return expectation in the long-term is higher for the emerging markets than for European
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markets in terms of average, mode and median return expectations. The variance of the long­
term expectations for emerging markets is again significantly higher than that for the 
European markets (four-fold). The variance of the long-term expected returns is 40% lower 
than the variance of the short-term expectations.
When analysing the premium in long-term return expectations for the emerging markets over 
European markets, the regression model with the premium as a dependent variable cannot 
explain the premium (Adj. R-Square 0.056) and neither can any single characteristic of an 
investment advisor. That is, there is no such an advisor characteristic that could statistically 
significantly explain why the average return expectation for the emerging markets is higher. 
Yet, the regression analysis shows that the explanatory variables drive the results into an 
expected direction. First, university education and passing FASD II decreases the emerging 
markets premium in return expectations (t=-1.09 and t=-1.11 respectively). In turn, those who 
perceive themselves as worse than average forecasters expect higher premium (t=1.55) than 
other investment advisors. As will be seen later on, the gender of an advisor plays a 
significant role in return expectations. With regards to the emerging markets premium, 
women expect higher premium than men (t=1.67). The age or the employer of an advisor does 
not relate to the emerging markets premium in any way.
5.5.3. Perceived ability to forecast future returns
After responding to the questions on the expected returns in European markets and the 
emerging markets, the respondents were asked to evaluate whether they perceive themselves 
as better, worse or similar in forecasting future returns than other investment advisors. 
Overall, 10% considered themselves as better, 12% as worse and 79% as average forecasters. 
Hence, the average confidence level of investment advisors does not suggest either 
professional overconfidence or lack of confidence. Yet, when those who perceive themselves 
as worse forecasters are compared to those who perceive themselves as better forecasters, 
some interesting results that support earlier studies can be found in the average expected 
returns as well as in the demographic differences of those with different levels of confidence.
Following the earlier studies of overconfidence, the expected returns were the lowest in the 
group of investment advisors with low confidence both in the short-term and long-term for 
European markets and in the short-term for the emerging markets. However, the expectations
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in the group of high confidence were no higher than in the average confidence group. 
Furthermore, when the expectations of high confidence group are compared to both the 
groups of low confidence and average confidence, no statistically significant differences are 
found. Consequently, no evidence can be found on the relation between the perception of 
one’s own ability to forecast future returns and one’s return expectations. The false-consensus 
effect is at its strongest in the group of ‘average forecasters’ (pO.OOl). Table 4 summarizes 
the expectations by confidence groups.
Table 4 Market return expectations by confidence group
Table presents the return expectations in subgroups which each form a confidence group based on what a subject 
perceives one’s own ability to forecast to be compared to other investment advisors.
Column [1] denotes the statistical significance of the difference between the average return expectation within a 
confidence group and the real professional consensus.
Column [2] denotes the significance of the false-consensus effect when the perceived professional consensus 
within a confidence group is compared to the real professional consensus.
Column [3] implies for the statistical significance of the difference between the average expected return within a 
confidence group and the perceived consensus within that group.
Statistical significance is denoted in the following way: *** pO.OOl; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
1-year, Europe
Average Standard Perveiced Standard
expectation deviation HI consensus deviation [2] [3]
Better than average 6.11 5.90 0.42 8.82 6.27 3.19 ** -2.14 *
Worse than average 4.51 4.68 -1.62 7.25 6.25 1.42 -2.18 *
No better/ no worse 5.86 5.54 0.31 8.39 5.91 6.55 *** -5.88 ***
20-years, Europe
Average Standard Perveiced Standard
expectation deviation HI consensus deviation [21 [3]
Better than average 9.80 3.12 -0.62 11.29 3.74 2.06 * -2.15 *
Worse than average 9.27 3.16 -1.63 11.05 4.36 1.32 -2.14 *
No better/ no worse 10.22 5.12 0.35 12.15 6.53 5.04 *** -4.46 ***
Expectations for emerging markets
1-year 20 years
Average Stdev [1] Average Stdev HI
Better than average 10.13 12.06 -0.78 14.01 5.45 -1.51
Worse than average 9.63 14.17 -0.88 17.08 14.43 0.78
No better/ no worse 11.97 13.05 0.40 15.27 9.60 -0.14
Although no differences in return forecasts between confidence groups was found, some 
interesting findings in the perceived ability to forecast can be made especially between 
genders. Following the evidence of e.g. Lewellen et al (1977), and Barber and Odean (2001),
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this study shows that the level of confidence is to some extent dependent on gender. This can 
be seen in the distribution of genders in both the high confidence group and the low 
confidence group. Only 6% of women and as much as 17% of men consider themselves as 
better than average forecasters whereas 15% of women and only 5% of men think they are 
worse than average in forecasting future stock market returns. Interestingly though, the 
average return expectations of all women are significantly higher than the average 
expectations of men (see next chapter for further discussion on gender effect).
As far as the education of an investment advisor is concerned some support for earlier studies 
can be found in that education does increase overconfidence. Interestingly, university 
graduates are the only educational group that more often consider themselves as better (14%) 
rather than worse (7%) future return forecasters compared to other investment advisors. In all 
other educational groups, there are more of those that perceive themselves as below average 
rather than above average forecasters. In the two lowest educational groups, as many as 18% 
of the investment advisors perceive themselves as worse than average forecasters. Again, 
more confident and in this case more educated investment advisors do not expect higher 
returns than less confident and less educated. Also, it should be noted that perceiving one’s 
own abilities to be above average does not necessarily mean that one is overconfident. More 
likely, one could explain the confidence with longer experience or higher and more work- 
related education. Another education related factor that increases investment advisors’ 
confidence level in making forecasts is the FASD II examination. Out of those who have 
passed FASD II, 13% believe they are better than average at making return expectations while 
only 3% perceive themselves as worse than average in forecasting. 8% of those who have not 
passed FASD II are confident that they make better than average return forecasts whereas as 
much as 16% believe the opposite. The difference in the group of low confidence is 
considerable and suggests that FASD II examination really increases the confidence level.
When the banks are compared, Bank E has by far the most confident investment advisors 
when measured with the perceived ability to forecast. 24% of Bank E investment advisors 
consider themselves as better and none as worse at making forecasts on future returns than 
other investment advisors22. The result is surprising in that Bank E also has the highest
22 However, it should also be noted that there was only 21 Bank E investment advisors who answered both the 
questions on the current employer and on one’s perception of own ability in forecasting returns.
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portion of women as investment advisors out of all banks (77%) and as earlier mentioned only 
6% of all women perceived themselves as better than average forecasters. Bank A and Bank В 
has the least confident investment advisors as in both banks the number of below average 
forecasters exceed the number of above average forecasters.
To further examine what affects one’s perceived ability to forecast, a logistic regression 
analysis with ten explanatory variables was carried out. The results are summarized in Table 
5. The results confirm the preceding conclusions in that passing the FASD II significantly 
increases one’s perceived ability to forecast (p<0.05). Also it verifies that the gender effect is 
indeed statistically highly significant (pO.OOl). That is, women on average perceive 
themselves as worse forecasters compared to other investment advisors. Out of the bank 
effects, only Bank E variable is significant (p<0.01) in increasing one’s perceived ability to 
forecast. The evidence found in this study indicates that confidence grows with higher 
education as earlier noted but the effect is not statistically significant.
Table 5 Regression analysis on the perceived ability to forecast returns
The table presents the results of a regression analysis carried out with an ordered logit model. The model uses 
737 observations out of the total of 742. Three observations are missing, as the respondents did not indicate their 
gender, 2 observations are missing due to non-response to the question on age. Gender variable equals to 1 if the 
subject is female, 0 is a subject is male. University education variable equals to 1 if the subject has a university 
degree, 0 otherwise (lower education or non-response). FASD II passed variable equals to 1 if a subject has 
passed the FASD II, 0 otherwise (not passed or non-response). Bank (А-E) variable equals to 1 if a subject is 
employed by Bank (A-E), 0 otherwise (other employer or non-response). Those respondents who did not 
respond to the question on the perceived ability to forecast are assumed to be average forecasters. All confidence 
groups have been taken into account in the model (0=worse than average, l=average, 2=better than average). 
The t-statisties are provided in parentheses under the parameter estimates.
Statistical significance is denoted in the following way: *** pO.OOl; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
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5.5.4. Expectations by demographic factors
This section gives the reader an overview on the differences in return expectations when 
demographic and other characteristics of an investment advisor have been taken into account. 
To study the impact of advisor characteristics to return expectations, several sub-analyses 
were carried out. Yet, only the most important and the most interesting ones are reported here 
in more detail. Based on the regression analysis, one can conclude that the gender and the 
perceived ability to forecast are factors that noticeably affect the investment advice received 
by a client but also several other variables have an effect yet not significant. Without trying to 
suggest whose advice is the most accurate, this chapter will look at the differences and 
similarities between certain broad demographic groups.
Keeping in mind the idea that more confident individuals are more risk averse and make 
higher forecasts as discussed earlier as well as the fact that in this study women were less 
confident than men in making forecasts, the return expectations by gender are surprising (see 
Table 6). By and large, women expect higher returns than men from both European stock 
markets and the emerging markets. In the expectations for European markets, the gender 
difference is statistically significant in the long-term investment horizon (pO.OOl, see row 
[4] in Table 6). The differences are however even more evident in the case of expectations for 
the emerging markets for which women expect a return of 13.5% and men of 8.5% in the 
short-term and an annual return of 16.9% and 12.7% in the long-term respectively. The 
gender effect in the emerging markets expectations is highly significant (pO.OOl) for both 1- 
year and 20-year periods. The variance of the long-term return expectations is notably higher 
for women compared to men in both the European markets and the emerging markets whereas 
difference in variances in short-term expectations is fairly trivial. When analyzing the false- 
consensus effect by gender, one can find that the effect is highly significant for women in 
both long-term and short-term regardless of whether the perceived consensus is compared to 
the real consensus of women or the real professional consensus (pO.OOl, see column [2] and 
column [3] in Table 6). By and large, the same result goes for men as well. It should however 
be noted that the gender difference can also be due to other factors. For example, women in 
this study are on average less educated and as will be seen in the next paragraphs less 
educated expect higher returns than more educated.
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Table 6 Market return expectations by gender
Column [1] denotes the statistical significance of the difference between the average return expectation of men 
(women) and the real professional consensus
Column [2] denotes the significance of the false-consensus effect when the perceived professional consensus of 
women (men) is compared to the real professional consensus.
Column [3] implies for the statistical significance of the difference between the average expected return of 
women (men) and the perceived consensus by women (men).
Row [4] shows the significance of the difference between women and men in each return expectation or 
perceived consensus.










Women 6.03 5.41 0.73 8.11 6.42 5.08 *** 4.12 ***
Men 5.28 5.50 -0.96 8.66 5.04 6.35 *** 5.98 ***
[4] 1.46 -1.00
20-years, Europe
Average Standard Perveiced Standard
expectation deviation [11 consensus deviation [2] [3]
Women 10.78 5.72 1.78 12.88 7.32 5.75 *** 3.91 ***
Men 8.89 1.87 -5.11 *** 10.59 3.03 1.59 6.36 ***
[4] 5.44 *** 4.65 ***
Expectations for emerging markets
1-year 20 years
Average Stdev [1] Average Stdev [1]
Women 13.46 13.31 1.84 16.85 11.51 1.87
Men 8.49 12.29 -2.75 *** 12.65 4.70 -4.78 ***
[4] 4.01 *** 5.63 ***
In this survey, education plays a role when forecasting expected returns as can be concluded 
from Table 7. Broadly speaking all the expectations for both European markets and the 
emerging markets decrease with higher education23. Those whose highest degree is from 
comprehensive school expect slightly higher returns than those who have graduated from high 
school. Again high school graduates’ expectations are higher than those of university 
equivalent graduates. The lowest average expectations are all from the group of university 
graduates with the exception of 1-year perceived professional consensus for European 
markets. Overall, the differences in return expectations between educational classes are
23 Vocational school graduates are an exception to the conclusion. No explanation for this result could be found.
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statistically significant in long-term expectations but not in short-term expectations. 
Furthermore, the variance of individual expectations was the highest for those who only have 
passed comprehensive school and the lowest for university graduates.
Interestingly, the group of university graduates - although being the most pessimistic 
themselves on the short-term stock market returns in Europe - expect other investment 
advisors to forecast returns of 8.8% for the next 12 months, which is higher than what any 
other educational class expects. That is, university graduates suffer the most from the false- 
consensus effect in that they expect others to be considerably more optimistic on the short­
term returns. Yet, they do not anchor their own expectations on the perceived consensus but 
instead are close to the real professional consensus. By and large, when the average perceived 
consensus in an educational class is compared to the real professional consensus, one can 
conclude that the false-consensus effect is statistically significant in all educational classes. 
Furthermore, the difference between the average expectations in a given educational class and 
the perceived professional consensus in the class is statistically significant with the only 
exception of the comprehensive school graduates. Although the percentage difference 
between the average expected long-term return within an educational class and the perceived 
consensus in a given class is the highest in the comprehensive school class out of all 
educational classes the high variance of responses and the relatively low number of 
respondents decrease the statistical significance of the difference and hence it is the only 
educational class where the false-consensus effect cannot be shown to exist.
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Table 7 Market return expectations by education
Column [1] denotes the statistical significance of the difference between the average return expectation within an 
educational class and the real professional consensus.
Column [2] denotes the significance of the false-consensus effect when the perceived professional consensus 
within an educational class is compared to the real professional consensus.
Column [3] implies for the statistical significance of the difference between the average expected return within 
an educational class and the perceived consensus within that class.










Comprehensive school 6.04 6.50 0.26 8.31 7.45 1.79 1.25
Vocational school 5.91 4.44 0.33 8.10 5.02 4.10 *** 3.21 **
high school grad 6.23 4.76 0.83 8.72 6.28 3.74 *** 2.68 **
University equiv. grad 5.68 6.02 -0.10 7.78 6.48 3.25 ** 2.74 "










Comprehensive school 12.38 8.40 1.59 15.45 8.96 3.30 ** 1.43
Vocational school 9.41 3.02 -1.96 11.14 4.95 1.95 3.06 **
high school grad 11.89 6.08 2.58 * 14.28 9.11 3.82 *** 1.90 **
University equiv. grad 9.92 4.94 -0.40 11.71 5.65 3.04 ** 2.83 **
University graduate 9.16 2.76 -2.91 ** 10.81 3.18 1.97 4.33 ***
Expectations for emerging markets
1-year 20 years
Average Stdev [1] Average Stdev [1]
Comprehensive school 12.97 11.53 0.63 21.43 16.63 2.10 *
Vocational school 12.63 11.93 0.75 13.61 7.48 -2.07 *
high school grad 12.64 14.00 0.60 19.03 11.31 2.74 **
University equiv. grad 11.00 14.32 -0.43 15.51 10.30 0.15
University graduate 10.42 12.51 -0.90 12.64 5.36 -4.14 ***
Although the preceding paragraphs showed that education affects the return expectations of 
an investment advisor, the FASD examinations do not seem to affect the investment advisors’ 
expectations. The year a respondent has passed the first-level FASD examination does not 
correlate with the market return expectations. Given that there is only one exception where 
2001 graduates are more pessimistic on future returns than other year-groups and no other 
significant differences are found, one can conclude that there are no differences between year- 
groups and the exception found seems trivial. Based on the data available in this survey, one
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cannot conclude whether there are differences between the investment advisors who have 
passed FASD I and those who have not and it therefore remains a question to be answered in 
forthcoming studies. However, it does not seem likely that any significant differences could 
be found, as no considerable distinction can either be made between the return expectations of 
those who have passed FASD II examination and those who have not (see Table 8). Given the 
results of no correlation between FASD I examination and the graduate year as well as the 
fact that only 20% of the respondents have passed FASD II examination, no further analysis 
on the different years for passing FASD II was carried out.
Table 8 Market return expectations by FASD II examination
Column [1] denotes the statistical significance of the difference between the average return expectation of those 
who have (not) passed FASD II and the real professional consensus.
Column [2] denotes the significance of the false-consensus effect when the perceived professional consensus of 
those who have (not) passed FASD II is compared to the real professional consensus.
Column [3] implies for the statistical significance of the difference between the average expected return of those 
who have (not) passed FASD II and the perceived consensus by the same group.










Not passed 5.55 5.24 -0.48 8.10 5.75 5.17 *** 5.05 ***
Passed 5.94 5.71 0.32 9.32 6.23 5.45 *** 4.11 ***
[4] -0.61 -1.70
20-years, Europe
Average Standard Perveiced Standard
expectation deviation [1] consensus deviation [21 El
Not passed 9.91 4.09 -0.57 11.96 5.97 4.22 *** 4 44 ***
Passed 9.49 3.61 -1.53 11.25 4.21 2 53 * 6.36 ***
[4] 1.00 1.26
Expectations for emerging markets
1-year 20 years
Average Stdev [1] Average Stdev [11
Not passed 12.08 13.05 0.46 15.89 10.28 0.67
Passed 10.22 12.52 -0.98 13.13 5.74 -3.21 **
[4] 1.22 3.28 **
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In relation to expertise and learning, age has also been shown to affect investor behaviour. 
Komiotis and Kumar (2006) found that with age an investor has better knowledge and takes 
less risk than younger investors but that the investment performance would decrease with 
older age. In order to analyse the relation between the age of an investment advisor and the 
expected returns on stock markets in this study, the respondents were divided into three 
subgroups. Investment advisors under 40-year old represent 30% of the respondents and those 
over age of 50 form another 30%. The remaining 40% represent the investment advisors 
between the ages of 40-49. The results are summarized in Table 9.
Overall, the average expectations within an age group do not differ significantly from the real 
professional consensus (see column [1] in Table 9). In European markets, the group of 
youngest investment advisors (under 40-year olds) expect the highest short-term returns but 
the lowest long-term average returns, when measured with both their own expectations and 
their perceived professional consensus. Also, the youngest investment advisors are the most 
pessimistic on the return expectations for the emerging markets in both short-term and long­
term. The differences between the long-term return expectations of the youngest and the 
oldest are statistically significant in the long-term but not in the short-term for both European 
markets (t=2.15, p<0.05) and the emerging markets (t=3.64, pO.OOl). Interestingly, under 
40-year olds seem to be the least unanimous in forecasting short-term returns but the most 
unanimous on their ability to forecast long-term returns when measured by the variance of 
forecasts. By and large, the variance of responses is the highest in all the short-term 
expectations but the lowest in all the long-term expectations among the group of the youngest 
investment advisors. The false-consensus effect in each age group is in statistically significant 
level in both short-term and long-term expectations. This applies to both the comparisons 
against the real consensus within an age group and against the real professional consensus 
(see column [2] and column [2] in Table 9). It should however be noted that the results on the 
relation between the age of an investment advisor and the expected returns is subject to 
moderate change depending on what individual expectations are taken into account. For 
example, in the group of over 50-year olds there are more extremely high expectations in the 
long-term period than there are in the other two groups. Furthermore, although it can 
evidently be shown that the average expectations vary between age groups, the regression
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analysis confirms that the regression between the age of each individual and expected returns 
is weak (R2 less than 0.04 in all cases).
Table 9 Market return expectations by age group
Column [1] denotes the statistical significance of the difference between the average return expectation within an 
age group and the real professional consensus.
Column [2] denotes the significance of the false-consensus effect when the perceived professional consensus 
within an age group is compared to the real professional consensus.
Column [3] implies for the statistical significance of the difference between the average expected return within 
an age group and the perceived consensus within the same age group.










under 40 6.35 6.47 1.01 9.94 6.00 7.41 *** 4.80 ***
40-49 5.35 526 -0.86 7.63 5.90 3.67 *** 3.87 ***










under 40 9.51 3.34 -1.70 11.42 3.58 3.64 *" 4.76 ***
40-49 10.20 5.56 0.23 11.96 7.07 3 28 ** 2.69 **
over 50 10.54 4.87 0.99 12.74 6.92 4.12 *** 3.04 **
Expectations for emerging markets
1-year 20 years
Average Stdev [1] Average Stdev [1]
under 40 10.71 13.12 -0.69 13.54 5.88 -2.77 **
40-49 11.32 12.92 -0.24 15.11 9.90 -0.31
over 50 12.91 13.40 1.00 17.64 12.25 2.04 *
It was not clear ex ante whether the employer of an investment advisor would have any effect 
on one’s return expectations as no previous empirical evidence has been published on the 
subject. Yet, this study shows that the role of an employer is significant in investment 
advising. The empirical results in Table 10 show that there are significant differences in the 
average expected returns between banks and that the information sources an investment 
advisor uses to determine the return forecasts vary considerably between banks as well (see 
chapter 5.5.5 for more details on the information sources). In analysing the relation between
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the employer and return forecasts of an investment advisor, some interesting differences in 
expectations were revealed. Overall, the investment advisors of Bank C had lower 
expectations than investment advisors from any other bank in both European markets and the 
emerging markets in short-term and long-term. In fact, the average expectations of Bank C 
vary considerably from the professional consensus in all market expectations (p<0.001, see 
column [1] in Table 10). Furthermore, the return expectations of Bank C investment advisors 
are not just the lowest but also the least variant within a bank in both short-term and long­
term expectations with just one exception. The low variances could partly be explained by the 
fact that 99% of Bank C employees reported the material provided by the bank as one of the 
most important sources of information. Hence, as they all use the same material it is possible 
that the data provided in the material affects the return forecasts in the same way. However, it 
does not differentiate Bank C from all other banks as employer’s material turned out to be the 
most used source of information in all banks even if not as significant as in Bank C. With 
regards to the perceived professional consensus, Bank C investment advisors again forecast 
significantly lower numbers than anyone else (excluding Bank E). In Bank C, the average 
perceived short-term consensus of 6.1% differs significantly (p<0.01) from the average 
expectation of 4.0% within the bank but is in fact fairly close to the real professional 
consensus of 5.7%. The investment advisors in most banks suffer from statistically significant 
false-consensus effect in that the average perceived consensus within a bank is significantly 
different to the real professional consensus and/or the average expectation within a bank.
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Table 10 Market return expectations by employer
Column [I] denotes the statistical significance of the difference between the average return expectation within a 
bank and the real professional consensus.
Column [2] denotes the significance of the false-consensus effect when the perceived professional consensus 
within a bank is compared to the real professional consensus.
Column [3] implies for the statistical significance of the difference between the average expected return within a 
bank and the perceived consensus within the same bank.










A 6.07 5.15 0.79 8.43 5.78 5.85 *** 4.66 •"
В 7.15 3.59 1.67 9.78 6.06 2.93 ** 1.67
C 3.97 4.52 -3.40 “ 6.14 4.87 0.69 3.13 **
D 7.28 5.99 1.72 9.51 6 38 3.87 *** 1.76
E 5.33 5.44 -0.34 8.24 5.60 1.80 1.60
Other 6.74 6.89 0.90 10.34 6.96 4.07 *“ 2.32 *
20-years, Europe
Average Standard Perveiced Standard
expectation deviation Ml consensus deviation (21 [3]
A 10.66 5.62 1.38 12.44 6.48 4.97 *** 3.28 **
В 11.52 5.87 1.10 15.21 11.09 2.11 * 1.35
C 8.87 1.84 -4.42 *** 10.60 4.03 1.08 3.82 ***
D 9.27 4.34 -1.25 10.33 4.59 0.31 1.12
E 10.83 4.73 0.67 13.06 5.74 2.10 * 1.28
Other 9.30 2.55 -1.83 12.20 5.23 2.54 * 3.27 **
Expectations for emerging markets
1-year 20 years
Average Stdev Ml Average Stdev Ml
A 11.37 13.14 -0 22 16.02 10.19 0.85
В 20.33 16.74 2.19 * 21.40 16.22 1.65
C 7.66 8.21 -3.69 *** 12.61 5.52 -3.88 ***
D 15.03 13.22 1.73 15.24 11.30 -0.07
E 14.00 12.71 0.74 16.06 7.39 0.39
Other 14.18 16.76 0.94 14.67 888 -0.48
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By simply looking at the results by a single factor such as education or gender it is impossible 
to determine which factors really drive the results. In order to reveal the most important 
factors that affect an investment advisor’s return expectations, a regression analysis was 
carried out. The regression analysis, which has the average long-term return expectation for 
European markets as a dependent variable, takes into account 12 explanatory variables that 
could drive the results. The results are summarized in Table 11 {specification (1)).
Overall, the regression model explains 5.6% of the long-term return expectations for the 
European markets. The results imply that the gender of an investment advisor is the most 
significant factor in determining one’s return expectations (p<0.001)24. Women expect 
considerably higher returns than men, which can also be seen in Table 6. The results on 
perceived ability to forecast suggest that ‘worse forecasters’ are more conservative with their 
return expectations than others whereas ‘better forecasters’ expect the market to return more 
than what other investment advisors are expecting. The dummy variable ‘worse forecasters’ 
reaches the level of statistical significance (p<0.05). Variables Age and Age-Squared suggest 
that age does not play a significant role in making return forecasts. As indicated in Table 5, 
education is negatively correlated with return expectations but the effect is not statistically 
significant in the regression analysis. The same conclusion on the negative sign of the 
regression can be made with FASD II variable in that those who have passed the FASD II 
expect lower future returns than those who have not passed the examination. However, the 
significance of the result is lower for FASD II variable than for education variable. The 
negative t-value for Bank C and Bank D dummy variables imply that both the two banks as an 
employer decrease an investment advisor’s expected future returns compared to other 
investment advisors.
24 The regression analysis where non-respondents were excluded instead of being assumed to have answered as 
described in the previous paragraph was also carried out. The number of observations used in the analysis now 
decrease to 473 and missing values increase to 269. R2 is slightly lower at 0.078. In terms of gender, t-value is 
3.06 which signifies that the variable is now significant at 0.01 level (p=0.0023). The sign of t-values for all 
variables remains the same and no variable in addition to gender and ‘worse forecaster’ is statistically 
significant.
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Table 11 Regression analysis on the long-term return expectations
The table reports results from linear regression model, which describes the relationship between long-term return 
expectation of investment advisors and advisor characteristics. In all specifications the dependent variable is the 
average 20-year return expectation for the European markets. Gender variable equals to 1 if the subject is 
female, 0 is a subject is male. University education variable equals to 1 if the subject has a university degree, 0 
otherwise (lower education or non-response). FASD II passed variable equals to I if a subject has passed the 
FASD II, 0 otherwise (not passed or non-response). Bank (А-E) variable equals to 1 if a subject is employed by 
the bank (A-E), 0 otherwise (other employer or non-response). Better (worse) than average forecaster variable 
equals to I if a subject perceives to be better (worse) than average forecaster, 0 otherwise (worse (better) or 
average forecaster or non-response). Specification (1) shows the results for the overall analysis, which uses 509 
observations out of the total of 742. Three observations are missing due to non-response to the question on 
gender and 230 as a result of non-response to long-term return expectation or due to data cleaning. Specification 
(2) shows the results for the subgroup of women (N=326) and specification (3) the results for the subgroup of 
men (N=183). Missing values in subgroups are due to non-response to the question on gender and as a result of 
non-response to long-term return expectation or due to data cleaning.
T-statistics are provided in parentheses under the parameter estimates. Statistical significance is denoted in the 
following way: *** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05. Adjusted R-Square provides evidence on the explanatory 
power of the model.




Intercept 6.279 6.810 7.642 **
(1.45) (0.88) (3.08)
Gender, female 1.599 •**
(3.31)
Age 0.121 0.138 0.092
(0.58) (0.39) (0.75)
Age-squared -0 001 -0.001 -0.001
(-045) (-0.27) (-0.71)
Unversity education -0.473 -0.842 -0.229
(-0.91) (-0.92) (-0.82)
FASD II passed -0.542 -0.528 -0.354
(-ЮЗ) (-0.63) (-1.06)
Bank A 0.582 1.258 -0.371
(0.79) (1.01) (-0.87)
Bank В 1.195 2.623 -1.960 *
(0.98) (1.39) (-2 38)
Bank C -1.360 -1.723 -0.274
(-1.67) (-1.27) (-0.56)
Bank D -0.899 -0.603 -1.305 *
(-095) (-0.38) (-2.36)
Bank E 0.573 0.792 0.838
(0.46) (0.43) (0.92)
Better than average forecaster 0.248 0.573 0.091
(0.35) (0.43) (0.24)
Worse than average forecaster -1.460 * -1.409 -1.765 **
(-1.98) (-140) (-2 77)
Adjusted R-Scjuare 0.056 0.032 0.059
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To further examine the gender effect, which turned out to be the only highly significant factor 
in the regression analysis, the regression is carried out separately for both genders. The same 
explanatory variables are used as in the overall regression analysis with the exception of 
gender variable, which is now excluded. 326 women and 183 men are included in the 
analyses out of the total of 498 women and 241 men who participated in the survey. The 
results are summarized in Table 11 (specifications (2) and (3)).
When comparing the Adjusted R-Squares in the two models, it can be concluded that the 
regression model explains the return expectations of men better than of women (0.059 vs. 
0.032). The intercept of the model for men is 0.83 higher than for women, which is surprising 
given that women on average have higher return expectations than men (see Table 6) and yet 
no other variable can either explain women’s return expectations statistically significantly. 
Men, whose employer is either Bank D or Bank B, expect lower returns than men from other 
banks (p<0.05 respectively). Also men who perceive themselves to be worse than average 
forecasters have lower return expectations compared to others (p<0.01). Interestingly, the sign 
of the effect of two of the bank variables varies between genders. Bank A and Bank В as an 
employer increase the expectations of women but makes men forecast lower returns than 
investment advisors from other banks.
When the regression analyses for genders is carried out without taking into account employer 
dummies, the explanatory power of the models decrease considerably. F-values decrease from 
1.98 to only 0.77 for women and from 2.03 to 1.57 for men, which imply that the models no 
longer explain the return expectations. No variable is statistically significant with the 
exception of ‘worse forecaster’ variable for men as already noted in the previous model. 
However, now that the bank effect is excluded, the intercepts for the gender models change so 
that the intercept for women is considerably higher than for men (9.86 for women, 6.80 for 
men).
5.5.5. Sources of information used in forecasting future returns
To find out what sources of information an investment advisor uses in the forecasting process, 
a question on the most important sources was posed. The respondents were asked to choose 
one to three most important sources of information one uses when making forecasts on future 
market returns. Seven options were offered but one could also write down a source outside the
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list. As the survey did not technically limit the number of choices made, there was a number 
of respondents who exceeded the choice of three most important ones which was asked for. 
49% chose 3 options, 9% chose one or two of the options, 12% exceeded the limit of three 
options and 30% did not answer the question at all. In the analysis, only those respondents 
who chose three options are included in order to make the analysis more straightforward25. 
The results from the analysis are summarized in Table 12 and will be referred to as the overall 
results in the subsequent paragraphs.
Table 12 The most important sources ofinformation in returns expectations
The table shows the importance of certain information sources for investment advisors in making stock market 
return forecasts. The investment advisors are subcategorized by employer, gender and education (both in terms 
of educational background and FASD II) of an investment advisor. Each figure shows what percentage of the 
subgroup has included a certain source of information in the top three of the most important sources one uses 
















Bank A 35% 40% 54% 23% 90% 23% 34% 2%
Bank В 62% 31% 77% 15% 54% 46% 8% 8%
Bank C 28% 49% 51% 15% 99% 25% 31% 1%
Bank D 11% 46% 69% 26% 97% 17% 31% 3%
Bank E 18% 47% 53% 29% 100% 24% 29% 0%
Other 36% 45% 42% 21% 64% 52% 33% 6%
BY GENDER:
Women 25% 42% 59% 23% 93% 21% 35% 2%
Men 43% 46% 47% 19% 81% 34% 26% 4%
BY EDUCATION: 
Compr. school 42% 46% 50% 17% 71% 29% 46% 0%
Vocational school 19% 44% 67% 18% 95% 21% 36% 1%
high school grad 38% 43% 52% 20% 93% 28% 23% 3%
University equiv. 33% 44% 49% 25% 88% 26% 33% 3%
University grad 35% 43% 54% 22% 86% 26% 31% 3%
BY APVY II:
Not passed 25% 37% 62% 21% 89% 27% 36% 2%
Passed 2001-2006 39% 51% 40% 28% 88% 27% 24% 2%
All 32% 43% 55% 21% 89% 26% 32% 2%
25 To find out whether excluding those who did not obey the limit of three options affects the results, two 
different versions of the initial analysis were carried out. The first analysis included all respondents who had 
chosen at least one option and the second one only took into account those who had chosen exactly three options. 
In both analyses the percentage of those who uses a certain source of information was very close to each other. 
As the results are very similar in both groups, the analysis is carried out by using the data of respondents who 
chose exactly three options in the list.
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Clearly the most used source of information when making forecasts for future returns is the 
material provided by an investment advisor’s own employer as 89% of investment advisors 
chose that among the three most important sources. The respondents were not asked to 
specify what kind of material they are provided, yet it is likely to mean strategic reviews, 
market recommendations and so on. Business magazines and the level of interest rates are 
also among the three most important sources of information that investment advisors use, with 
proportions of 55% and 43% respectively. Roughly a third say that conversations with 
colleagues would be in their list of the three most important sources and another third uses the 
company ratios in making return forecasts. 26% of investment advisors find strategic reviews 
published by someone else than one’s own employer useful and think they are among the 
most important sources. Yet 21% also see the historical returns as an important factor in 
future return expectations. Outside the list proposed, the investment advisors list the following 
items among the sources of information: internet, electronic market information, the general 
state of the world, news, Reuters, Bloomberg, lectures organised by the employer, 
Momingstar, market risk premium, macroeconomic numbers, raw materials, exchange rates, 
stocks, hedging, TV, media, conversations with clients that have profit-making portfolios, 
chat (internet), own perceptions and risk/retum -analysis.
Again, depending on certain demographic characteristics, the use of sources of information 
differs, although not crucially. The biggest differences can be found between banks although 
some differences were also found between genders as well as between educational classes. In 
Bank C, Bank D and Bank E close to 100% and 90% in Bank A includes the use of material 
provided by one’s own employer in the list of the most important sources. In Bank B, only 
half of the investment advisors think so. This is probably due to the fact that in Bank В and 
other smaller banks, there is usually no investment analysis of their own but it has been 
outsourced. Furthermore, the investment advisors of Bank В more often chose business 
magazines or company ratios than own employer’s material as one of the most important 
sources. Interestingly, Bank В investment advisors perceive the importance of other suggested 
sources differently as well. While only 8% of the investment advisors in Bank В included 
conversations with colleagues as important and as much as 62% thought that company ratios 
should be in the list of top three sources, roughly one third of investment advisors in other 
banks perceived one or both of these sources in the list of the most important.
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Between genders and educational classes, the differences are not crucial and the overall list of 
top three sources is applicable to all subclasses. Yet it is interesting to notice that women use 
the material provided by the employer, conversations with colleagues as well as business 
magazines as a source for return forecasts more often than men. Men in turn use external 
strategic reviews and company ratios in their forecasting process more often than women do. 
As far as education is concerned, the results do not support the hypothesis that experts (in 
terms of higher education) would use historical return as a source of information less than 
those who have lower education. The finding is in line with Kaustia et al (2006). However, 
although the differences are not considerable it is interesting to note that those who have 
passed FASD II seem to use more number-based sources than those who have not passed the 
examination. Some differences can also be found between educational classes. Those who 
only have passed the comprehensive school use the material of own employer the least (71%) 
out of all educational classes but find conversations with colleagues more useful than others 
(46%). The vocational school graduates hardly use company ratios whereas they perceive 
business magazines more important a source of information compared to investment advisors 
with other educational background.
5.6. Views on the relation between firm characteristics and the expected return
This chapter presents the results from the third part of the survey in which investment 
advisors were asked to evaluate certain firm characteristics and their effect on the expected 
return on a stock. The chapter will provide evidence on which firm characteristics the Finnish 
investment advisors see as factors that affect their return expectation or required return on an 
asset. More importantly though, the results provide evidence on the effect of framing 
manipulation in judging the risk-return relations. To my best knowledge this study is the only 
one along with Glaser et al (2006) to document the framing effect in relation to stock market 
forecasts where the point of view of the question is highly significant.
Although the results are based on an experiment they have strong implications for practice as 
well. The results imply that depending on what a client asks and how he asks it, the advice 
one will receive can vary significantly. While the results of this experiment do not prove that 
investment advisors give inconsistent advice to their clients, the results do however strongly 
indicate that the advisors are perceptive of unconsciously doing so. In fact, the framing effect 
is so compelling in the experiment of this study that the analysis of results in this chapter will
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only concentrate on the overall analysis of the responses which itself provides strong evidence 
on the effect of psychology in financial decision making. The further analysis by subgroups is 
excluded at this point, as it seems evident that the significance of the framing effect will 
remain high in all demographic groups and the potential difference between these groups is of 
less importance. Only the role of expertise is further examined in Chapter 5.6.3 as several 
recent studies have found that expertise decreases the effect of behavioural biases (e.g. 
Kaustia et al, 2006; Glaser et al, 2006). The main results from each framing setting are 
summarized in Table 13.
Table 13 The relationship between firm characteristics and the expected return in different framing 
settings
In Framing 1 the respondents were asked to answer yes or no to the questions. E.g. “In order to invest in a stock 
of a company that is more leveraged than average, 1 would require higher than average return.”
In Framing 2 and Framing 3 the question is “How would the following firm characteristics affect your view on 
the future return for a stock?” In Framing 2 the proposition would be “A company has less debt than average” 
and in Framing 3 “A company has more debt than average”. In both the two frames, there are three answering 
options: higher return, lower return and no effect.
The first paragraph in each answer box is the number of respondents who chose that answer. The second 
paragraph in each box represents the percentage of respondents who chose that answer.
fram ¡na 1 Yes No Total
Poor liquidity-? higher return 150 89 % 18 11 % 168 100 %
Less analysts following -> " 88 52% 80 48 % 168 100 %
Highly leveraged -> " 144 86 % 23 14 % 167 100 %
Poor growth prospects -> " 129 78 % 37 22 % 166 100 %
framing 2 Higher return Lower return No effect Total
Poor liquidity 11 7 % 116 77% 24 16% 151 100 %
More analysts following 45 30 % 17 11 % 90 59 % 152 100 %
Less leveraged 106 70 % 19 13 % 26 17% 151 100 %
Poor growth prospects 3 2 % 140 93 % 8 5 % 151 100 %





















framinq 2+3 combined Higher return Lower return No effect Total
Poor liquidity 23 7 % 220 70 % 71 23 % 314 100 %
Less analysts following 47 15 % 81 26 % 187 59 % 315 100%
Highly leveraged 39 13 % 212 68 % 60 19 % 311 100 %
Poor growth prospects 6 2 % 292 93 % 16 5 % 314 100 %
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5.6.1. The effect on return requirements (Framing 1)
The overall picture of the results in Framing 1 is that the views of investment advisors 
coincide well with the CAPM and the empirical evidence on realized returns presented in 
Chapter 3.1. That is, the results of this group suggest that the relations between firm 
characteristics and expected returns are in line with the relations that have been proven to 
exist in case of realized returns. As far as liquidity is concerned, the evidence in Framing 1 
supports the earlier findings of e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2001) in that the return requirement on an asset is negatively correlated with liquidity. That 
is, when a stock is highly liquid the required return on an asset is lower and vice versa. 
Although 11% of the respondents in the Framing 1 group do not require extra return for less 
liquid investments, it seems that investment advisors by and large accept the negative 
relationship between liquidity and required return on a stock. The same conclusion can be 
drawn in the relationships between leverage and required return as well as between a 
company’s future growth prospects and required return. 86% of investment advisors require 
higher than average return on a company that is more leveraged than an average company. 
Correspondingly 78% agree with the earlier studies (see Helander, 2005) in that a company 
with worse than average future growth prospects will have to provide a premium in the return 
compared to otherwise similar companies in order to be an interesting investment. The analyst 
coverage of a company seems to divide the investment advisors. Roughly half of respondents 
in Framing 1 group agree and half disagree with the proposition that a company, which has 
fewer analysts following its business, is riskier and hence has to provide higher returns. 
Hence, the finding does not support the empirical evidence on the negative relation between 
the growth prospects of a company and realized returns.
5.6.2. The effect on expected returns (Framing 2 and Framing 3)
Although the results from Framing 1 itself do not seem to provide any interesting new 
information on expected stock returns, what makes the results obtained in the survey 
compelling is the difference of responses in Framing 1 compared to Framing 2 and Framing 3. 
Although several earlier studies in various fields have shown that psychological manipulation 
has an effect on decision-making (see chapter 4) there is no previous evidence on the 
manipulation as such used in this experiment. By simply changing the point of view from 
asking for the effect of a firm characteristic on return expectation instead of on required return
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as in Framing 1, the conclusions drawn turn upside down. The only exception is the question 
on the analyst coverage, which is not considered to be that related to future returns on a stock 
and divides the professionals in all framing groups.
In Framing 2 and Framing 3 the conclusions on the results are similar with regards to all firm 
characteristics and hence they will be treated as one in the analysis. The positive or negative 
working of a characteristic did only have a significant effect in case of liquidity. In framing 2 
77% infer that poor liquidity leads to lower returns and in framing 3 ‘only’ 64% suggest that 
high liquidity leads to higher returns. With regards to liquidity, difference between the two is 
statistically significant (z=2.52, p<0.05) but as there is no difference in the opposite responses 
(Framing 2 higher returns vs Framing 3 lower returns) nor is there statistically significant 
differences in any other characteristics, the result can be treated as a chance result26. Hence, 
overall the positive or negative working of a characteristic does not affect the answers but in 
turn the change in the perspective of a question is highly significant. That is, when comparing 
the results in Framing 1 to those in the two latter ones the differences are statistically highly 
significant. Overall, the findings in Framing 2 and Framing 3 contradict with the CAPM and 
the empirical findings on realized stock returns with regards to liquidity, leverage and the 
growth prospects of a company. In turn, the evidence in this study supports the findings of 
e.g. Shefrin and Statman (1995) in that investors perceive the stocks of ‘good companies’ as 
good investments. The investment advisors in this experiment seem to form a negative 
association between risk and return and as a consequence end up expecting higher returns 
from less risky stocks.
26 The differences between Framing 2 and Framing 3 were tested by the chi- square goodness-of-fit test to find 
out whether the two can be regarded as one group. E.g. the z-value for ‘p°or liquidity’ is measured by comparing 
the answers poor liquidity->Yes (Framing 2) to high liquidity->No (Framing 3). Similarly z-value for 'high 
liquidity’ is given by the difference between poor liquidity->No (Framing 2) and high liquidity->Yes (Framing 
3). Statistical significance (sig.) is denoted in the following way: *** pO.OOl; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05.
z-value P sig.
Poor liquidity -0.026 0.979
More analysts following 1.872 0.062
Less leveraged 1.051 0.294
Poor outlook 0.095 0.925
High liquidity 2.517 0.012 *
Less analysts following -1.465 0.144
Highly leveraged 0.016 0.988
Great outlook -0.186 0.853
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First, 70% of the respondents expect stocks that are less liquid than an average to have lower 
returns. The result is against the CAPM and the empirical evidence on realized stock returns 
of e.g. Amihud and Mendelson (1986). Moreover, the question on liquidity is the one in 
which Framing 1 group was the most unanimous about but to the opposite direction than in 
the two other framing groups. In the Framing 1, as much as 89% of the investment advisors 
state that they require higher return from a stock with poor liquidity. However, in Framing 
2+3 only 7% agree with the proposition and instead 70% expect lower returns from less liquid 
companies compared to more liquid but otherwise similar companies.
With regards to leverage, a majority of the respondents expect lower returns on companies 
that are more leveraged than average (68%). Similarly, the return expectations are the higher 
the less leveraged a company is. Again this is against the CAPM and the empirical evidence 
of Bhandari (1988) and Fama and French (1992). Moreover, the results are the opposite of 
what was found in Framing 1 but support the behavioural asset pricing theories. Based on the 
results in the two latter framing groups investment advisors seem to think that ‘good 
companies’ are good investments in relation to the capital structure of the company as well. 
That is, they consider companies with low debt/equity -ratio as good companies and as an 
investment that will provide higher returns than more leveraged companies.
Similarly, investment advisors show a strong preference for stocks with great growth 
prospects in terms of analyst expectations. As much as 93% of the respondents see companies 
with better than average growth prospects as good investments which will provide better than 
average returns in future. Yet, 78% of the respondents in Framing 1 say that in order to invest 
in a company that has worse than average growth prospects, they require higher than average 
return on investment. The finding in the two latter framing groups is again against the 
evidence on realized stock returns.
Overall, this chapter shows that the implications of framing manipulation can be severe in the 
field of investment advising. With the exception of analyst coverage, the results are highly 
robust in indicating that the framing manipulation has a very strong effect on an investment 
advisor’s judgements. Given that liquidity, leverage and growth prospects are all well-known 
firm characteristics with a certain effect on the risk of an investment, the effect of the 
manipulation is surprisingly strong. The fact that clients do ask same questions in varying
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ways means that the effect of framing can be important in real-life investment advising 
situations as well. The results imply that situational factors can influence the advice that a 
client receives from a professional. In fact, this study shows that the advice on the effect of 
firm characteristics to equity returns that an investment advisor gives can vary significantly 
depending on the way one poses the question. However, it should also be kept in mind that 
earlier empirical evidence on behavioural biases shows that individuals independent of their 
characteristics or profession have been shown to suffer from the biases and hence it is no 
surprise to find that investment advisors are affected by the framing manipulation.
5.6.3. Expertise and framing effect
Several studies such as Glaser et al (2006) and Kaustia et al (2006) have shown that the effect 
of behavioural biases decreases with expertise. In this study education will be used as a proxy 
for expertise to test whether the expertise of an investment advisor changes the effect of 
framing. The group of those who have a university degree or a university equivalent degree is 
now considered as high expertise investment advisors. The results for the ‘high expertise’ 
subgroup are summarized in Table 14.
The results in this study imply that expertise does not reduce the effect of framing 
manipulation. When comparing the overall results to the results of the subgroup with high 
expertise in terms of education, no statistically significant differences were found27. It is 
however possible that financial education would be a better proxy for expertise than the level 
of education per se. Alternatively, work experience in the financial markets could act as a
27 The differences between Framing 2 and Framing 3 were tested by the chi- square goodness-of-fit test to find 
out whether the two can be regarded as one group. E.g. the z-value for ‘poor liquidity’ is measured by comparing 
the answers poor liquidity->Yes (Framing 2) to high liquidity->No (Framing 3). Similarly z-value for ‘high 
liquidity’ is given by the difference between poor liquidity->No (Framing 2) and high liquidity->Yes (Framing 
3). Statistical significance (sig.) is denoted in the following way: *** p<0.001; ** pO.Ol; * p<0.05.
z-value P sig.
Poor liquidity 0.1257 0.9001
More analysts following 0.1123 0.9107
Less leveraged -0.4942 0.6218
Poor outlook -0.0723 0.9424
High liquidity 1.4729 0.1418
Less analysts following -1.2947 0.1964
Highly leveraged 0.4773 0.6335
Great outlook 0.7280 0.4672
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better proxy for expertise than education. In this study, the responses on work experience 
rather imply to the experience in investment advising and hence they cannot be used as a good 
proxy for experience in the broader field of financial markets. Therefore the role of work 
experience in framing effect is not examined in this study and is left as an interest to further 
research.
Table 14 The relationship between firm characteristics and the expected return among the ‘high 
expertise’ subgroup
In this case high expertise is defined as those who have a degree in university or university equivalent.
In Framing 1 the respondents were asked to answer yes or no to the questions. E.g. “In order to invest in a stock 
of a company that is more leveraged than average, 1 would require higher than average return.”
In Framing 2 and Framing 3 the question is “How would the following firm characteristics affect your view on 
the future return for a stock?” In Framing 2 the proposition would be “A company has less debt than average” 
and in Framing 3 “A company has more debt than average”. In both the two frames, there are three answering 
options: higher return, lower return and no effect.
The first paragraph in each answer box is the number of respondents who chose that answer. The second 
paragraph in each box represents the percentage of respondents who chose that answer.
framing 1 Yes No Total
Poor liquidity-» higher return 87 92 % 8 8 % 95 100 %
Less analysts following -> " 49 51 % 47 49 % 96 100 %
Highly leveraged -> " 82 86 % 13 14 % 95 100 %
Poor growth prospects -> " 75 80 % 19 20 % 94 100 %
framing 2 Higher return Lower return No effect Total
Poor liquidity 8 9 % 61 70 % 18 21 % 87 100 %
More analysts following 21 24 % 13 15 % 53 61 % 87 100 %
Less leveraged 55 63 % 13 15 % 19 22 % 87 100 %
Poor growth prospects 2 2 % 82 94 % 3 3 % 87 100 %
framing 3
High liquidity 
Less analysts following 
Highly leveraged 
Good growth prospects
Higher return Lower return No effect Total
48 59 % 7 9 % 26 32 % 81 100 %
19 23 % 19 23 % 43 53 % 81 100 %
9 11 % 52 66 % 18 23 % 79 100 %
74 91 % 2 2 % 5 6 % 81 100 %
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5.7. Shortcomings of the study
Although the results on the return expectations per se and in relation to firm characteristics 
. seem robust there are a few drawbacks that might to some extent affect the results. However, I 
do not believe that the conclusions drawn would be any different regardless of the 
shortcomings given the large number of respondents.
First, it cannot be assured that no investment advisor has asked someone else’s opinion and 
advice before answering the questions. Although the respondents were asked to answer the 
questions based on their own opinions there is a chance of cooperation, as the survey was not 
conducted as a controlled experiment but the respondents were able to participate to the 
survey online. As there is no data on the location of each investment advisor, one cannot test 
whether certain offices would have similar answers. Yet, it seems unlikely that it would be the 
case.
Second, in relation to return expectations it is likely that some respondents have 
misunderstood the question on long-term returns regardless of the instructions given in the 
survey. It seems apparent that those who provided three-digit return expectation estimates or 
those whose long-term expectations were considerably more optimistic than short-term 
expectations had provided the total expected return over the 20-year period instead of an 
annual expectation for the same period. As already discussed in 5.3, data cleaning was carried 
out in which the most obvious misunderstandings were deleted from the analysis. Despite the 
fact that the most obvious errors have been ignored, it is still possible that some error answers 
affect the results and hence the long-term return expectations would be somewhat upward 
biased. Yet, it has no effect on the analysis of false-consensus effect as the responses of those 
who have misunderstood the term ‘annual long-term expected return’ are most likely biased 
in all questions related to the long-term period. That is, both the long-term expectation of the 
respondent and his perceived long-term consensus forecast might be biased upwards but it 
does not affect the relative comparison between the two. Given that the primary motivation of 
this study is to find out whether any advisor or firm characteristic can explain the return 
expectations of the Finnish investment advisors, the potential problem with certain long-term 
expectations does not affect the results of this study.
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have studied the effect of advisor characteristics on investment advisors’ 
market return forecasts for European markets and the emerging markets. In addition, an 
empirical experiment was carried out to examine whether framing manipulation affects ones’ 
views on the relations between firm characteristics and stock returns. The empirical research 
was performed as an online-based questionnaire among Finnish investment advisors who 
have passed the FASD General Securities Examination. In total 742 advisors participated in 
the survey, which is 68% of those who received the email regarding the study. The group of 
respondents represents well the characteristics of all investment advisors and hence the results 
of this study can be generalized to concern all advisors. Overall, I find that Finnish investment 
advisors are affected by advisor and stock characteristics as well as framing manipulation 
when making return forecasts. I find that certain characteristics of an advisor explain one’s 
return forecasts statistically significantly. This suggests that a client asking for investment 
advice might get varying advice depending on how and to whom one poses the question. I 
also find that investment advisors on average perceive to be more optimistic on the future 
market returns than they really are. That is, an average investment advisor expects others to 
have higher expectations on the future market returns than they really do.
Overall, the professional consensus on market returns on both European markets and the 
emerging markets suggest that Finnish investment advisors expect the markets to generate 
lower annual returns in the short-term than in the long-term. Moreover, the average 
expectations for the emerging markets are significantly higher than for European markets both 
in short-term and in long-term and even after controlling for the most overoptimistic 
expectations (p<0.001). On average, the Finnish investment advisors expect European stock 
markets to return 5.7% over the next 12 months and 10.1% p.a. over the next 20 years. For the 
emerging markets the average expectations are 11.6% and 15.4% respectively. The perceived 
professional consensus for the European markets is statistically significantly higher than the 
real professional consensus in both time horizons (p<0.001). In other words, the professionals 
on average suffer from false-consensus effect. However, the return expectations depend on 
the characteristics of an advisor and hence among certain subgroups the average return 
expectations as well as the effect size of the bias can differ substantially. In particular, the 
gender effect was found to be statistically highly significant (p<0.001) as the average long-
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term return expectation for European markets was significantly higher among women 
compared to men. Also, one’s perceived ability to forecast was a significant factor in 
explaining the return forecasts in case where an advisor perceives to be worse than average 
forecaster (p<0.05). Interestingly though, women turn out to be considerably less confident on 
their ability to forecast than men. In fact, the gender effect explains the perceived ability to 
forecast statistically significantly (p<0.001) along with FASD II degree (p<0.05) and with one 
of the employer dummies (p<0.01) of which the latter two have a positive effect on one’s 
perceived ability to forecast.
Along with the study of Glaser et al (2006) this study is to my best knowledge the only one to 
document the framing effect in relation to stock market forecasts. To carry out the 
experiment, the respondents were randomly divided into three homogenous groups which all 
responded to only one set of questions in relation to firm characteristics and their effect on 
return expectations and return requirements. The question sets all asked a respondent to 
evaluate how a specific firm characteristic would affect one’s required return or return 
expectation compared to an otherwise similar company. Framing 1 asked whether a 
respondent would require higher return from a company that is for example less liquid than 
average. In relation to liquidity, the other two framings asked whether the expected return for 
a stock is higher or lower for a company of which the liquidity is worse than average 
(Framing 2)/ better than average (Framing 3) or if the liquidity has any effect on the 
expectation at all. That is, the latter two framings only differ in the wording of the 
characteristic, which eventually was found to have no significant effect on the results. 
However, the difference in the answers is compelling between Framing 1 and Framing 2+3. 
The results suggest that depending on how the question is framed - whether the question is 
related to required return or expected return - the relation between firm characteristics and 
stock return is seen differently. While in Framing 1 the investment advisors state that they 
require higher return from less liquid stocks (89%), in Framing 2+3 the conclusion is the 
opposite as the advisors expect lower returns from less liquid stocks (70%). The same 
conclusion can be drawn with regards to the leverage and growth prospects of a company. 
The level of analyst coverage, which was also included in the experiment, was the only 
characteristic to divide the advisors in all framing settings. To test whether expertise 
decreases the effect of biases as shown in the empirical studies of Glaser et al (2006) and 
Kaustia et al (2006), a sub-analysis for experts was also carried out. By using education as a
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proxy for the level of expertise, one cannot find evidence on expertise decreasing the effect of 
framing manipulation among Finnish investment advisors. Consistent with the empirical 
evidence of La Porta et al (1997) and Shefrin (2001), investment advisors seem to perceive 
good companies as good investments that also provide better returns. However, the result is 
dependent on the framing of the question, which suggests that the professionals are in fact 
highly sensitive to psychological manipulation.
While the results of this study do not prove that investment advisors give inconsistent advice 
to their clients, the results do however strongly indicate that the advisors are perceptive of 
unconsciously doing so. First, the empirical evidence of this study shows that expected stock 
market returns vary depending on the advisor’s characteristics. Second, the advice on the 
effect of firm characteristics on stock returns might differ depending on how a question is 
framed. Hence, a noteworthy implication of the experiment is that the situational factors can 
indeed affect a real-life investment advising as well.
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APPENDIX 1 Requirements for the investment advisors in Finland
Legislation now and in the future
Today, Act on Investment Services only requires the management of the investment services 
companies to be suitable and have professional skills to be eligible for getting an operating 
licence while employees working for these companies do not have to be authorized or have 
any specific education (excluding stock- and derivatives brokers)28. However, the legislation 
is about to change and individual investment advisors will be required to have an 
authorization as well. The European Union’s new Directive on Markets in Financial 
Instruments (MiFID) will apply from 2007 and it includes a wide variety of developments for 
the industry such as including investment advice within the scope of EU regulation. The 
specific changes in the Finnish legislation are yet to be decided.
FASD examinations
The Finnish Association of Securities Dealers (FASD) is the co-operation and self-regulatory 
organisation of the Finnish investment services industry. It maintains and develops a system 
for investment services degree, which consists of two examinations: FASD General Securities 
Examination and FASD Investment Advisor Examination. Both examinations have been part 
of the self-regulation of FASD since 2001 and over 3000 people have passed the first level 
exam since. The objective of the system is to improve the financial skills and knowledge of 
the people who work in the industry as well as to enhance the image of the industry. 
However, as the law does not yet require authorization for investment advisors, they are not 
required to pass the FASD examinations either and so taking the examinations is entirely 
voluntary. In order to take the FASD examinations, no education or prior work experience in 
the industry is required and no class participation is obligatory either. Thus to get both 
degrees, one only needs to pass the two examinations.
28 FINLEX
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APPENDIX 2A The questionnaire in Finnish
The survey was carried out in Finnish. Hence, the original version of the questionnaire is provided here. See 
Appendix lb for the English translation.
Yleisohjeet vastaamiseen
Kyselyyn vastaaminen kestää noin 5 minuuttia. Voit siirtyä kysymyksestä toiseen klikkaamalla 
edellinen/seuraava. Kun olet vastannut kaikkiin kysymyksiin ja lähettänyt kysymyksesi klikkaamalla valmis, et 
voi enää palata muuttamaan vastauksiasi. On tärkeää, että vastaat omien mielipiteidesi mukaan, sillä oikeita 














□ Yliopisto / Korkeakoulu
Sijoitusneuvojan tutkinto







□ En ole suorittanut
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□ En ole suorittanut
APVY:n tentteihin valmentavat kurssit, joille olen osallistunut (järjestäjä ja vuosi) 
[avoin vastaus]
Työnantaja ja kokemus






a Muu, mikä? [avoin vastaus]
Olen toiminut sijoitusneuvojana
____ vuotta
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Asiakas kysyy mielipidettäsi keskimääräisestä tuotosta Euroopan osakemarkkinoilla tulevaisuudessa. Oletetaan 
tässä, että asiakkaan kysymys koskee ns. vanhoja EU-maita (Alankomaat, Belgia, Englanti, Espanja, Irlanti, 
Italia, Itävalta, Kreikka, Luxemburg, Portugali, Ranska, Ruotsi, Saksa, Suomi ja Tanska), eli rajataan tässä pois 
Itä-Euroopan kehittyvät markkinat.
Anna arviosi seuraaviin kysymyksiin ilman vaihteluvälejä.
Minkä arvion annat tulevasta vuotuisesta tuotosta asiakkaallesi, kun hänen sijoitushorisonttinsa on
lyhyellä aikavälillä (1 vuosi), % p.a. _______________
pitkällä aikavälillä (20 vuotta) % p.a. _______________
Miten arvioisit muiden sijoitusneuvojien keskimäärin neuvovan asiakastasi Euroopan osakemarkkinoiden 
tulevan vuotuisen tuoton suhteen?
lyhyellä aikavälillä (1 vuosi), % p.a. _______________
pitkällä aikavälillä (20 vuotta) % p.a. _______________
Kehittyvien osakemarkkinoiden tuotto-odotukset
Seuraavaksi asiakas kysyy mielipidettäsi kehittyvistä markkinoista (Kiina, Intia, Venäjä, Itä-Eurooppa, Etelä- 
Amerikka jne). Mikä on keskimääräinen vuotuinen tuotto-odotuksesi näiden alueiden osakemarkkinoille?
lyhyellä aikavälillä (1 vuosi), % p.a. _______________
pitkällä aikavälillä (20 vuotta) % p.a. _______________
Lähteet tuotto-odotuksille






□ Oman työnantajan materiaali (strategiakatsaukset ym.)
□ Ulkopuoliset strategiakatsaukset ym.
□ Keskustelut kollegoiden kanssa
□ Muu, mikä? [avoin vastaus]








□ Ei parempi eikä huonompi
III: YRITYKSEN OMINAISUUKSIEN VAIKUTUS TUOTTO-ODOTUKSEEN
Yleisohje: Ajattele yritystä, joka on kaikessa suhteessa keskimääräinen paitsi kysytyssä asiassa. Jos ajattelet 
ensin, että "riippuu tilanteesta" niin muista, että tilanteen oletetaan muilta osin olevan keskimääräinen/normaali.
FRAMING 1 [tämä otsikko ei ollut näkyvissä vastaajille]




Jotta suostuisin sijoittamaan osakkeeseen jota seuraa keskimääräistä vähemmän analyytikoita, vaatisin 
siltä keskimääräistä parempaa tuottoa.
□ Kyllä
□ Ei




Jotta suostuisin sijoittamaan keskimääräistä huonommat kasvunäkymät (analyytikoidcn 
tuloskasvuodotukset viiden vuoden tähtäimellä, konsensusennusteen mukaan) omaavan yrityksen 
osakkeeseen, vaatisin siltä keskimääräistä parempaa tuottoa.
□ Kyllä
□ Ei
FRAMING 2 [tämä otsikko ei ollut näkyvissä vastaajille]
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Mikäli haluat osallistua Miten sijoitan rahastoihin -kirjan arvontaan ja/tai saada yhteenvedon tuloksista 




Voit nyt lähettää vastauksesi klikkaamalla valmis.
Kiitos osallistumisestasi!
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APPENDIX 2B The questionnaire in English (translated)
The survey was carried out in Finnish. The original version of the questionnaire in Finnish can be found in 
Appendix la.
General instructions for responding to the survey
Participating in the survey takes approximately 5 minutes. You can move from one question to another by 
clicking next/previous. Once you have responded to all questions and sent your answers by clicking ready, you 
cannot return to the survey and change your answers. It is important that you base your responses on your own 









Educational background (the highest degree passed)
□ Comprehensive school
□ Vocational School











□ I have not passed FASD 1
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□ I have not passed FASD 11
The preparatory courses for the FASD examinations that I have participated in (who organised and 
course and the year of participation) [Open response]
Employer and experience






□ Other, (please specify) [open response]
1 have worked as an investment advisor for
_______ years
Title or organisational position, if not investment advisor 
[Open response]
Contacts with clients
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The average duration of an investment discussion with a client
______minutes
II: EXPECTED RETURNS ON STOCK MARKETS
Return expectations for the European stock markets
A client asks for your opinion on the average future return for the European stock markets. Assume, that the 
questions concern so called ’old’ EU-countries (Netherlands, Belgium, England, Spain, Ireland, Italy Austria, 
Greece, Luxembourg, Portugal, France, Sweden, Germany, Finland and Denmark); that is the emerging Eastern 
European markets are now excluded.
Please, give your estimates without confidence intervals.
What estimate on the annual future return do you give for a client who’s investment horizon is
In the short-term (I year), % p.a. ______________
In the long-term (20 years) % p.a. ______________
How would you estimate other investment advisors on average to advice your client on the annual future 
return for the European markets?
In the short-term ( 1 year), % p.a. ______________
In the long-term (20 years) % p.a. ______________
Return expectations for the Emerging stock markets
Next, your client asks for your opinion on the Emerging markets (China, India, Russia, Eastern Europe, 
South America etc). What is your average annual return expectation for these markets
In the short-term ( 1 year), % p.a. ______________
In the long-term (20 years) % p.a. ______________
Sources for return expectations
What sources ofinformation do you use in making return expectations for stock markets? Please choose 





□ Material of own employer
□ External strategic reviews etc
□ Conversations with colleagues
□ Other (please specify) [open response]
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Own ability to forecast
What is your perception of your own ability to forecast future returns of stock markets compared to other 
investment advisors
□ Better than average
□ Worse than average
□ Not better, not worse
III: THE EFFECT OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS TO RETURN EXPECTATIONS
General instruction: Think of a company, that is average in all terms expect in the one that is being asked. If your 
first thought is that ’it depends on the situation’ remember that the situation is assumed to be average/normal in 
all other terms.
FRAMING 1 [This header hidden from respondents]




In order to invest in a stock of a company that is being followed by fewer analysts than average, I would 
require higher than average return.
□ Yes
□ No




In order to invest in a stock of a company that has worse than average future growth prospects (according 




FRAMING 2 [This header hidden from respondents]
How would the following firm characteristics affect your view on the expected future return for a stock 
[capital gains+dividend)?
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The company that has worse than average future growth prospects (according to the consensus of analysts 





Have you previously participated in a survey that is related to return expectations for stock markets?
□ Yes
□ No
□ I cannot remember
In case you would like to participate in the lottery to win the book ’Miten sijoitan rahastoihin’ and/or 
receive a summary on the results before they are being published, please write down your e-mail address 
in one of the following:
Lottery and summary _____________________________
Only the lottery ______________________________
Only the summary _____________________________
You can now send your answers by clicking ready.
Thank you for your participation!
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